**Contention 1: The Wake Up Call**

Stanford International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic (IHRCRC) and Global Justice Clinic (GJC) at NYU School of Law 2012 [February, Living Under Drones, “Victim Stories” http://www.livingunderdrones.org/victim-stories/]

Sadaullah Wazir, teenager, former student from the village of Machi Khel in Mir Ali, North Waziristan, was severely injured in a September 2009 drone strike on hi**s** grandfather’s home.[1] Sadaullah has filed a complaint before the UN Human Rights Council.[2]

“Before the drone strikes started, my life was very good. I used to go to school and I used to be quite busy with that, but after the drone strikes, I stopped going to school now. I was happy because I thought I would become a doctor.” Sadaullah recalled, “Two missiles [were] fired at our hujra and three people died. My cousin and I were injured. We didn’t hear the missile at all and then it was there.” He further explained, “[The last thing I remembered was that] we had just broken our fast where we had eaten and just prayed. . . .We were having tea and just eating a bit and then there were missiles. . . . When I gained consciousness, there was a bandage on my eye. I didn’t know what had happened to my eye and I could only see from one.” Sadaullah lost both of his legs and one of his eyes in the attack. He informed us, “Before [the strike], my life was normal and very good because I could go anywhere and do anything. But now I am not able to do that because I have to stay inside. . . . Sometimes I have really bad headaches. . . . [and] if I walk too much [on my prosthetic legs], my legs hurt a lot. [Drones have] drastically affected life [in our area].”

#### I bet you don’t care. No offense. I didn’t use to either – I used to think that people who post about drones on facebook are annoying hippies who believe too hard in the alt.

#### But reading stories like this – that started to change. I started to understand that there’s something horrible going on in the world – we’re killing people that we don’t like and we don’t even acknowledge it. When John Bolton was asked about civilian casualties from drone strikes – he said there were zero and the American public by majority agrees that drone strikes are an effective policy solution to terrorism.

#### And that’s not right. For some reason we’ve abandoned our moral sensibilities and just accepted that war is acceptable and normal. Because it doesn’t affect us. But what if it did?

#### Could you imagine? Your first day of college and you’re excited for the Tuesday debate meeting and then you hear it. A low flying airplane? Your heart starts racing. You’re sweating and then it’s over. You can’t walk between classes or focus hard enough to cut a card.

#### Bye bye NDT

#### There’s no way you could really put yourself in this position – but we start this debate here because our hope is that by reading and thinking about this story we can pierce through the administration’s story that we can center our thoughts around the pain and suffering of war and then maybe we can start to care.

#### We believe that that’s our only hope

### Contention 2: is Targeting Illogic

**It’s almost not surprising that we love drones – Ian Graham Shaw and Majed Akter explain that the American government has convinced itself that it has found the magical policy solution to terrorism that allows us to order missiles from the sky like a computer off amazon – no human contact**

**Shaw and Akhter, 2012** (Ian Graham Ronald, School of Geographical and Earth Sciences, The University of Glasgow and Majed, School of Geography and Development, University of Arizona, “The Unbearable Humanness of Drone Warfare in FATA, Pakistan” Antipode, 1500-1

In this sense, the drone is fundamentally a fetishized object. And we mean this in the Marxist sense of the concept—the object’s human relations are mystified and masked—as the drone presents itself to the world as an autonomous agent, isolated from the imperial and military apparatus behind it. Marx used the concept of the fetish in numerous ways to describe the exchange of commodities:

A commodity is therefore a mysterious thing, simply because in it the social character of men’s labour appears to them as an objective character stamped upon the product of that labour; because the relation of the producers to the sum total of their own labour is presented to them as a social relation, existing not between themselves, but between the products of their labour (Marx 1991:28).

The commodity fetish is a two-fold phenomenon: the commodity transcends the labour that produced it and appears as a separate and objectifiable “thing”, and consequently, its social origins are masked as its value appears contained in the “thing-itself”. Power and autonomy are presumed to exist within commodities themselves, rather than within their productive relations. Marx thus argues that the commodity is reified with an almost supernatural and quasi-religious status: “Its analysis shows that it is, in reality, a very queer thing, abounding in metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties” (Marx 1991:26). This fetishization extends from commodities into the cultural circuit more generally, as the work of cultural theorists Jameson, Adorno, Benjamin, Baudrillard, and Debord have differently illustrated.

The primary relationship evoked in most discussions of drone warfare is between a drone and its battlefield of objectified targets, **rather than the relationship between the team of technicians operating the drone as agents of American empire and the unsuspecting bodies surveilled and slaughtered on the ground in neo-colonial Pakistan.** In other words, drone warfare is thought of as a relationship between things, rather than between people. And the supernatural element is never far away. As Colonel Theodore Osowski of the US Air Force reveals in his Biblical allegory on drones: “It’s kind of like having God overhead. And lightning comes down in the form of a Hellfire” (quoted in Mockenhaupt 2009). It is therefore through fetishization that drones bomb sovereign Pakistani territory without the legal and territorial consequences of ground war. Far from “sitting there”, the drone performs the military logic of a “war without the war” to its extreme, which is to say, a war without bodies, a war of machines, and a war of discrete and surgical strikes from the sky.

A critical geography must therefore intervene to dismantle the production and maintenance of the drone fetish; a project allied to the work of feminist geographies and geopolitics that reinsert a disavowed corporeality (England 2003, 2006; Fluri 2009; Hyndman 2001, 2007; Massey 1994; Nicely 2009; Sharp 2007). Indeed, much of the military discourse is molded by the iron cast of paternalism: a feminized FATA “rescued” by masculine US forces—without mention of the human pain and suffering.

Objects, commodities, and technologies have always mattered to the unfolding stories of our lives (Kloppenburg 1988; Latour 1993, 2005; Mintz 1985; Robbins 2007; Schivelbusch 1987; White 1996; Winner 1977), as have their hybrid couplings (Haraway 1991; Whatmore 2006). The key point is that although the drone is capable of reconfiguring political and legal life, it does so through a network. As Latour (2005:56) writes: “An ‘actor’ in the hyphenated expression actor-network is not the source of an action but the moving target of a vast array of entities swarming around it”. In other words, the autonomy and exceptional status of the drone is always-already a production**. The Obama administration’s touting of the drone as the “magical solution” to the “war on terror” is a fetishization that occludes its unbearable humanness.**

**Beneath the magical solution is the cool calculation of a liberal war president – drones have put the power in his hands to fulfill his ideals of peace and security because drones allow the perfect balance of surveillance and executions that allow us to pretend that civilians like Sadullah Wazir don’t exist or that we are saving him from terrorism**

**Wilcox 2009** [Lauren, Charles and Amy Scharf Postdoctoral Fellow in the Department of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University, Body Counts: The Politics of Embodiment in Precision Warfare, Political Theory Colloquium]

In discourse of precision warfare, the deaths of civilians occupy a substantial, if not crucial, role. The sparing of civilian lives is given as a key rationale (second only to protecting the lives of servicemen and women) for the development and use of precision munitions. In this way, precision warfare is a key component of the entry of biopolitical rationality into the sphere of war. Foucault considers biopower to be the power “to designate what brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculation and made knowledge-power an agent of transformation of human life,” (Foucault 1978, 143). Precision bombing, as part of the liberal way of war, may be said to operate as part of the network of biopower through surveillance and precision targeting on behalf of war ostensibly fought for humanitarian reasons. Along with discipline, biopower constitutes one of the “two poles around which the organization of power over life was deployed” (the other being discipline) (Foucault 1978, 139). Biopower concerns the supervision and intervention regarding the biological processes of birth, mortality, health, and life expectancy. Liberal, high-tech wars embody biopolitical warfare, through which the logic and practice of precision bombing are emblematic. The very nature of precision bombing is of calculated risk, of circular error probabilities, that the bomb will hit its target. Throughout the twentieth century, different technologies have allowed the CEP to decrease. Death is rendered calculable—that is, the destruction of the target. Death for civilians is also understood in this framework of risk and probability. As one proponent writes, “[Precision munitions] should be our weapon of choice because it is the most discriminate, prudent and risk-free weapon in our arsenal,” (Melinger 2001).

#### We will impact out three warrants to the Wilcox evidence

#### The first is that the logic of calculation has taken us far further than we realize. Lives are only worth something within a giant human life budget by which Obama kills some people – wazir and saves others – us – to justify his spending elsewhere - It’s only a matter of time until none of us are worth money.

**Dillon 99** (Michael, Professor of Politics and International Relations – University of Lancaster, “Another Justice”, Political Theory, 27(2), April, p. 164-165)

Quite the reverse. The subject was never a firm foundation for justice, much less a hospitable vehicle for the reception of the call of another Justice. It was never in possession of that self-possession which was supposed to secure the certainty of itself, of a self-possession that would enable it ultimately to adjudicate everything. The very indexicality required of sovereign subjectivity gave rise rather to a commensurability much more **amenable to the expendability** required of the political and material economies of mass societies than it did to the singular, invaluable, and uncanny uniqueness of the self**. The value of the subject became the standard unit of currency for** the **political arithmetic** of States and the political economies of capitalism. **They trade in it still to devastating global effect. The technologisation of the political** has become manifest and global. Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability. Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation. Once rendered calculable, however, units of account are necessarily submissible not only to valuation but also, of course, to devaluation. Devaluation, logically, can extend to the point of counting as nothing. Hence, no mensuration without demensuration either. There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zero point of holocaust. However liberating and emancipating systems of value-rights-may claim to be, for example, they run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted out, the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life. Herewith, then, the necessity of championing the invaluable itself. For we must never forget that, “we are dealing always with whatever exceeds measure.” But how does that necessity present itself? Another Justice answers: as the surplus of the duty to answer to the claim of Justice over rights. Tha**t** duty, as with the advent of another Justice, is integral to the lack constitutive of the human way of being.

#### And targeting is a worldview – a few years back at a correspondents dinner – Obama joked that if the Jonas brothers who were playing at the dinner touched his daughters he could drone strike them – in a way that’s truer than we want – the world is just bullseyes and killlists to him now

**Shaw and Akhter, 2012** (Ian Graham Ronald, School of Geographical and Earth Sciences, The University of Glasgow and Majed, School of Geography and Development, University of Arizona, “The Unbearable Humanness of Drone Warfare in FATA, Pakistan” Antipode, 1494-6)

In this section, we argue that the ramping up of drone deployments is justified by a distinctive targeting logic. As Paul Virrilo (1989) has long argued, there is never war without representation, which is to say, the deadly materiality of war is always coiled within a discursive system (see also Shaw 2010). In this sense, the drone performs a well-rehearsed imaginative geography (Bialasiewicz et al 2007; Gregory 2004) that is underwritten by targeted kills across neat isometric grids and algorithmic calculations (Amoore 2009), far removed from the brutal Real (Jones and Clarke 2006), and in a peculiar relation with the visceral imagery of previous wars (Tuathail 2003). The official “definition” of a targeted kill is not agreed upon under international law. Yet as a recent UN report on targeted killing reveals, it can be thought of as follows:

A targeted killing is the intentional, premeditated and deliberate use of lethal force, by States or their agents acting under colour of law, or by an organized armed group in armed conflict, against a specific individual who is not in the physical custody of the perpetrator. In recent years, a few States have adopted policies, either openly or implicitly, of using targeted killings, including in the territories of other States. Such policies have been justified both as a legitimate response to “terrorist” threats and as a necessary response to the challenges of “asymmetric warfare”. In the legitimate struggle against terrorism, too many criminal acts have been re-characterized so as to justify addressing them within the framework of the law of armed conflict. New technologies, and especially unarmed combat aerial vehicles or “drones”, have been added into this mix, by making it easier to kill targets, with fewer risks to the targeting State (Alston 2010:3). The means and methods of killing vary, and include sniper fire, shooting at close range, missiles from helicopters, gunships, drones, the use of car bombs, and poison (Alston 2010:4)

The drone is heralded by the US military as the apex of a targeting logic— accurate, efficient, and deadly. This logic traces a distinct genesis. In 1938 Martin Heidegger wrote of the “age of the world picture”, in a classic essay on the split between subject and object. For him, today’s world is conceived, grasped, and conquered as a picture—and what it means “to be” is for the first time defined as the objectiveness of representing. In this modern age of humanism, a subjective “worldview” arises for the first time—humans appear as Cartesian subjects and the world as a calculated picture, engineered by science and technology. Ray Chow (2006) extends this metaphysical analysis to contend that the world has further been produced as a “target”. In the wake of the atomic event of **Hiroshima, the entire globe is rendered as a grid of targets to be destroyed as soon as it can be made visible. Indeed, to see is to destroy.**

Vision is thus crucial to an ocularcentric Western society (Rose 2001), and always already entangled within military culture. The ability to gaze from “nowhere” and yet represent “everywhere” is what Haraway (1988) labels the “god-trick”. She argues that the eyes have been perfected by the logics of military, capitalist, and colonial supremacy; one that is fundamentally located within a nexus of disembodiment: . . . the vantage point of the cyclopian, self-satiated eye of the master subject. The Western eye has fundamentally been a wandering eye. Vision is apparently without limit, the ‘ordinary primate’ can now see underwater, at night, through walls, into biological cells, onto distant galaxies: an “unregulated gluttony” that prides itself on its “objectivity” (1988:586).

This disembodied visual logic is perfected in the doctrine of airpower, the dominant theme of US national defense post World War II. Kaplan (2006a) names this a “cosmic view” that both unifies and separates “targets” from above. The sky is the space in which technology masters the world. It is clean, disembodied, and a place where nobody dies (that just happens on the ground). Do we not see here a colonial logic of “us” in the sky, versus “them” on the ground (Amoore 2009; Gregory 2010)? The drone is capable of performing (Bialasiewicz et al 2007) this logic, through a digital worldview of targets that dismisses ambiguity and reinforces the same old god-trick of a view of somewhere from nowhere (Kaplan 2006b). This is not to say that the sky is a space of pure deterritorialization (Deleuze and Guattari 1987). Since the mid-twentieth century the atmosphere has become increasingly nationalized, particularly after the Cold War (Kaplan 2006b; Williams 2010). The “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA) was a set of tactics put forward by the US military for securing the future of warfare (Kaplan 2009). They include information communications, space technology, satellites, drones, nano-robotics, all pivoting around the idea of “network-centric warfare”. As McDonald (2007) argues, this is precisely the reason that “outer space” needs to be investigated by critical geography, given that social life tied to the celestial, and space-based subjectivities are increasingly normalized.

**Orbital logics** thus **spill into the everyday, as does** the pervasive influence of **targeting** in US culture. From the use of GIS sciences that spatialize, calculate, and fix Cartesian wanderings—without a necessary appeal to the uniqueness of place or its crumpled ontologies—to the vicarious gazing and gaming of a far-away war (Shaw 2010; Wark 2007), targeting is now woven into the fabric of mundane life. GIS and GPS programs are no longer alien technologies used by armies and government agencies, but shared everyday practices. As such, **the drone is not an aberration—but the apex** of an expanding targeting zeitgeist. In this age, “**to be” is to be locked within the cool certainty of a crosshair.**

#### Finally the threats found within preemptive warfare are co-produced – the fear creates the threat - you shoot and then maybe ask questions later

**Massumi 07** (Brian, professor of Philosophy at European Graduate School, “Potential Politics and the Primacy of Pre-Emption” Retrieved 10/15/13 R.C.)

17.This co-productive logic is well illustrated in the policies and statements of the Bush administration, and explains why Bush has never admitted that the War in Iraq has been a failure even as he is coming to accept that it isn't exactly avictory yet and that "tactical changes" are now necessary. Consider this statement from June 19, 2005: "Some may agreewith my decision to remove Saddam Hussein from power, but allof us can agree that the world's terrorists have now made Iraq a central front in the war on terror." This was Bush's way of admitting that there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Objectively, his reasons for invading were false. But threat in today's world is not objective. It is potential. Potential threat calls for a potential politics. As Bush and many members of his administration have repeatedy argued, Saddam Hussein could have had weapons of mass destruction and that if he had had them, he would have used them. Could have, would have, if: the potential nature of the threat requires a conditional logic. A conditional statement cannot be wrong. First because it only asserts a potential, and second because, especially in the case of something so slippery as a potential, you can't prove the negative. Even if it wasn't actually there, it will always still have been there potentially: Saddam could have restarted his weapons projects at any moment. When you act on "could haves" and"would haves" you are right by definition as long as your reasons for acting are not objective. It is simply a category error to give empirical reasons for your actions with respect to potential politics. This is what the Bush administration insiders meant when they ridiculed "the reality-based community" as being hopelessly behind the times. Nowadays, your action is right by definition as long as you go politically conditional, and have a good reason for doing so.18.Fear is always a good reason to go politically conditional. Fear is the palpable action in the present of a threatening future cause. It acts just as palpably whether the threat is determinate or not. It weakens your resolve, createsstress, lowers consumer confidence, and may ultimately lead to individual and/or economic paralysis. To avoid the paralysis, which would make yourself even more of a target and carry the fear to even higher level, you must simply act. In Bush administration parlance, you "go kinetic."6 You leap into action on a level with the potential that frightens you. You do that, once again, by inciting the potential to take an actual shape you can respond to. You trigger a production of what you fear. You turn the objectively indeterminate cause into an actual effect so you can actually deal with it in some way. Any time you feel the need to act, then all you have to do is actuate a fear. The production of the effect follows as smoothly as a reflex. This affective dynamicis still very much in place, independent of Rumsfeld's individual fate. It will remain in place as long as fear and remains politicallyactuatable.

**Thus the plan**

**We are resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase restrictions on the war powers authority of the President of the United States to conduct targeted killing.**

### Contention 3: is so what the hell do we do?

#### We think that the important thing is to switch our perspectives around:

#### Carrie Johnson on NPR recently conducted a great interview with the victims and cataloguers of drone strikes:

Carrie Johnson 2013 [October 30, 2013, “Families Of Drone Strike Victims Tell Their Stories,” NPR, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=241782633]

REHMAN: (Through translator) I know Americans think drones are the answer, but I wish they could understand how I and other children in my community see drones.

JOHNSON: Zubair says he doesn't play soccer or cricket outdoors with his cousins anymore because they're too scared. His father, a primary school teacher named Rafiq ur Rehman told lawmakers that he worries, too.

RAFIQ UR REHMAN: (Through translator) As a teacher, my job is to educate. But how do I teach something like this? How do I explain what I myself do not understand? How can I, in good faith, reassure the children that the drone will not come back and kill them, too?

JOHNSON: The Rehman family came to Washington with the help of filmmaker Robert Greenwald, whose new documentary, called "Unmanned: America's Drone Wars," features them and other victims in Pakistan.

ROBERT GREENWALD: Almost everybody I talk to, at the end of the interview - and remember, these are people who had relatives killed by American policy - probably 60, 70 percent of them, at the end of the interview, would turned to me and say: Could you please tell President Obama that I'm not a terrorist?

#### What this interview underscores is the tension between perspectives – on our side – drones the best thing since magic bread – on the other there is real and hideous fear – there is confusion and there is a desperate hope that our side will somehow stop thinking of those people out there as terrorists or targets and come to understand them as human beings.

**We isolate three means of solvency**

#### The first is our challenge to sovereign exceptionalism

**Our debate resonates with the current legal debate about accountability – our intervention challenges the state of exception that surrounds questions of targeting and drone warfare**

**Shaw and Akhter, 2012** (Ian Graham Ronald, School of Geographical and Earth Sciences, The University of Glasgow and Majed, School of Geography and Development, University of Arizona, “The Unbearable Humanness of Drone Warfare in FATA, Pakistan” Antipode, 1504-05

The legal space that drones operate in is thus located in the deadly residue of drone and document. The ongoing silence of the CIA with respect to its drone operations in Pakistan is raising international and national criticism. Recent Congressional hearings in the USA have debated this, with much of the discussion centered on what counts as a legitimate “target” for assassination and “self-defense”. Indeed, the CIA’s drone strikes are controversial precisely because they exist in a shadowy vacuum of accountability. As the UN Special Rapporteur (on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions) Phillip Alston puts it, “Transparency is required by both [international humanitarian law] and human rights law. A lack of disclosure gives States a virtual and impermissible license to kill” (Alston 2010). This led a prominent law professor to suggest that drone pilots could be liable for war crimes (Hodge 2010). Currently, US drone attacks are justified following 9/11, an event that led Congress to grant the President the ability to use all necessary force against persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the attacks of 9/11 (“The authorization for use of military force against terrorists”, Public Law 107–40). In addition to domestic law, the USA relies on international law in the guise of Article 51 of the UN Charter: A targeted killing conducted by one State in the territory of a second State does not violate the second State’s sovereignty if either (a) the second State consents, or (b) the first, targeting, State has a right under international law to use force in self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter, because (i) the second State is responsible for an armed attack against the first State, or (ii) the second State is unwilling or unable to stop armed attacks against the first State launched from its territory. International law permits the use of lethal force in self-defence in response to an “armed attack” as long as that force is necessary and proportionate (Alston 2010:12).

Both the CIA and Pakistani government remain tight-lipped on the drone program, allowing it to persist in deadly ~~silence~~ unnoticed and continually undo FATA’s sovereignty. This is opposed to Alston’s (2010:27) recommendation that “If a State commits a targeted killing in the territory of another State, the second State should publicly indicate whether it gave consent, and on what basis”. US State Department Legal Advisor Harold Koh has defended the drone program, arguing the attacks against suspected al-Qaeda and Taliban targets are bundled into the nation’s legitimate right to self-defense: “Koh also asserted that in targeting suspected militants via drone strikes the United States was adhering to basic international humanitarian law rules regarding distinction and proportionality. These rules, meant to protect civilians from harm, do not protect civilians absolutely” (Mariner 2010). The status of “civilian” is therefore worryingly undermined by the drone. As one professor and legal scholar at George Washington University, puts it:

. . . instead of apologizing each time the wrong individual is targeted or collateral damage is caused, we should stress that the issue would be largely resolved in short order if the abusive civilians would stop their abusive practices and fight—if they must—according to established rules of war. They cannot have it both ways . . . (Etzioni 2010:67: emphasis in original).

There is therefore much at stake in drone warfare, including the status of those civilians under the constant watch of the Predator; human beings that are so often translated into statistical and targeted calculations. In this sense, our argument is that the US-led attacks in FATA result from the interactions between the drone itself and the legal history of Pakistan’s northwest, enshrined in FCR of 1901. Both of these objects act in concert to produce an exceptional and contingent space. In this sense, territory is itself a shifting outcome of wider political processes. Never does it sit there, and never does it sit still.

#### The second is our recognition of other life

#### **Our detailing of the real suffering of victims of drone warfare allows for a deeper challenge to militarism by making us more aware of its consequences – this corrects for a sovereign obsessed politics that forecloses our ability to think ethically about war**

Holmqvist, 2013 [Caroline, Holmqvist. Centre for International Studies, London School of Economics, UK Swedish National Defense College, Sweden, May 1, 2013, Undoing War: War Ontologies and the Materiality of Drone Warfare. <http://mil.sagepub.com/content/early>]

In so doing, this article contributes to two recent strands of debate in particular. First, it offers a new perspective on the ‘force of matter’, on the theoretical concern with materialism that has recently gained traction within International Relations (IR) and Critical Security Studies (CSS).1 Building on the philosophies of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Judith Butler, I seek to centre questions of human experience to the study of social and political phenomena, including war.2 Merleau-Ponty’s critical phenomenology – little invoked in IR or CSS – offers a perspective on matter/materialism that is unusually attentive to questions of consciousness, meaning-making and reflexivity. His focus on the physical, bodily manifestation of human perception (notably in The Primacy of Perception, 1964) and corporeality offers unique insights into the relationship between materiality, agency and subjectivity through a ‘return to lived experience before it is written over and objectified by theory’.3 Such a critical phenomenology, I will argue, agrees well with the interest in what it means, in ontological terms, to be human – a key concern of Judith Butler’s.

Second, this article contributes to current discussions of how war ought to be studied, a question that recently has generated considerable attention within Critical War Studies (CWS).4 Tarak Barkawi and Shane Brighton’s exposure of a long-standing neglect of the study of war as a phenomenon in its own right constitutes a starting point for this article; and while one may debate the extent to which war should be seen as a phenomenon distinct from others – as opposed to always and already embedded within processes of ‘normal’ political, everyday life – Barkawi and Brighton are right to highlight the absurdity in silently assuming a distinctiveness of war without attempting to investigate it.5 One person who did take the question of the phenomenological distinctiveness of war seriously was, of course, Carl von Clausewitz. ‘War’, he wrote on the first page of his opus, ‘is an act of force to compel the enemy to do our will’.6 Clausewitz’s phenomenology showed antagonism to be essential to war: whatever else war is, it is antagonistic, confrontational, coercive. Barkawi and Brighton seize on Clausewitz’s phenomenology in their suggestion that ‘fighting’ should be seen to have ‘ontological primacy’ for understanding war, though the ‘fighting’ they refer to is more than mere kinetic exchange, or its imminent possibility. Instead, fighting’s excess is what makes war irreducible to the instrumentalist readings offered by classic strategists, and the phenomenon of war both constitutive and ‘generative’.7 This perspective enables us to see how events in war are never ‘simply’ events: their reach and potency go infinitely further. For instance, the bombardment of a town or village is never simply the physical destruction inflicted: the impact on human lives, on individual psyches, thoughts and emotions, on hopes for the future on the part of those whose homes or livelihoods have been destroyed and who have lost loved ones, or suffered injury themselves, can never be fully addressed through the technical ambition of ‘reconstruction’. In terms of human experience – the focus of this article – fighting always exceeds ‘fighting’.

Conventional studies of war have largely neglected human experience, preferring to study war through abstracted notions of ‘the state’, ‘militaries’, ‘insurgents’ and so on.8 Elaine Scarry’s potent critique of conventional understandings of war as being ‘emptied of human content’ is inspirational: for Scarry, war is centrally constituted by the injury of human beings, and the institutionalisation, routinisation and bureaucratisation of war explicable only as a political consequence of the neglect of a core human experience – that of pain.9 For Christine Sylvester, too, injury constitutes the defining trait of the lived experience of war. Via the legacy of feminist theory, Sylvester calls for a centring of the study of war as experience on the body, both as a unit with agency and as a prime target of ‘war violence and war enthusiasms’.10 And in response to the neglect precisely of bodily experiences in the study of war, Kevin McSorely has suggested that war be studied as ‘embodied social practice’, constituted by ‘a range of sensory, affective and embodied practices’.11

In this article, I place a concern for ontology (ontologies of the body, of fighting, dying and of war itself) against the background of the advent of robotic warfare and, in particular, the growing reliance on the part of Western states on drone technologies. The guiding question, then, is that of how robotic warfare should influence our thinking about war and the commitment to studying its ‘fundamentals’, such that we may eventually think ethically and politically about war. By studying war as a phenomenon with its own ontological condition and structuring, interrogating bodies and the bodily experience of war, I seek to take up recent challenges from within CWS by incorporating a set of bodies less theorised – the steely bodies of drones – and asking how they fit with the fleshy ones of human beings.

#### And our discussion here resonates with a broader public conversation that allows us to rethink what it means for us to be political wartime subjects and allow for a broader outpouring of open grief and outrage at injustice disrupting political order.

**Butler, 2009** (Judith, original genius, “Frames of War,” Verso, 39-40)

So, one way of posing the question of who "we" are in these times of war is by asking whose lives are considered valuable, whose lives are mourned, and whose lives are considered ungrievable. We might think of war as dividing populations into those who are grievable and those who are not. An ungrievable life is one that cannot be mourned because it has never lived, that is, it has never counted as a life at all. We can see the division of the globe into grievable and ungrievable lives from the perspective of those who wage war in order to defend the lives of certain communities, and to defend them against the lives of others-even if it means taking those latter lives. After the attacks of 9/11, we encountered in the media graphic pictures of those who died, along with their names, their stories, the reactions of their families. Public grieving was dedicated to making these images iconic for the nation, which meant of course that there was considerably less public grieving for non-US nationals, and none at all for illegal workers.

The differential distribution of public grieving is a political issue of enormous significance. It has been since at least the time of Antigone, when she chose openly to mourn the death of one of her brothers even though it went against the sovereign law to do so. Why is it that governments so often seek to regulate and control who will be publicly grievable and who will not? In the initial years of the AIDS crisis in the US, the public vigils, and the Names Project broke through the public shame associated with dying from AIDS, a shame associated sometimes with homosexuality, and especially anal sex, and sometimes with drugs and promiscuity. It meant something to state and show the name, to put together some remnants of a life, to publicly display and avow the loss. **What would happen if those killed in the current wars were to be grieved in just such an open way?** Why is it that we are not given the names of all the war dead, including those the US has killed, of whom we will never have the image, the name, the story, never a testimonial shard of their life, something to see, to touch, to know? Although it is not possible to singularize every life destroyed in war, there are surely ways to register the populations injured and destroyed without fully assimilating to the iconic function of the image. 4

Open grieving is bound up with outrage, and outrage in the face of injustice or indeed of unbearable loss has enormous political potential. It is, after all, one of the reasons Plato wanted to ban the poets from the Republic. He thought that if the citizens went too often to watch tragedy, they would weep over the losses they saw, and that such open and public mourning, in disrupting the order and hierarchy of the soul, **would disrupt the order and hierarchy of political authority** as well. Whether we are speaking about open grief or outrage**, we are talking about affective responses** that are **highly regulated by regimes of power** and sometimes **subject to explicit censorship.** In the contemporary wars in which the US is directly engaged, those in Iraq and Afghanistan, we can see how affect is regulated to support both the war effort and, more specifically, nationalist belonging. When the photos of Abu Ghraib were first released in the US, conservative television pundits argued that it would be unAmerican to show them. We were not supposed to have graphic evidence of the acts of torture US personnel had committed. We were not supposed to know that the US had violated internationally recognized human rights. It was un-American to show these photos and un-American to glean information from them as to how the war was being conducted. The conservative political commentator Bill O'Reilly thought that the photos would create a negative image of the US and that we had an obligation to defend a positive image.5 Donald Rumsfeld said something similar, suggesting that it was anti-American to display the photos.6 Of course, neither considered that the American public might have a right to know about the activities of its military, or that the public's right to judge the war on the basis of full evidence is part of the democratic tradition of participation and deliberation. So what was really being said? It seems to me that those who sought to limit the power of the image in this instance also sought to limit the power of affect, of outrage, knowing full well that it could and would turn public opinion against the war in Iraq, **as indeed it did.**

**We are the reconceptualization of moral obligation – our identification with the victims of drone warfare breaks through the predetermination of traditional calculation and allows us to deal; with both the unknowability of the future and infinite responsibility we face in making moral decisions. Only doing so allows us to become moral subjects.**

**Dillon 99** (Michael, Professor of Politics and International Relations – University of Lancaster, “Another Justice”, Political Theory, 27(2), April, p. 166-167)

The event of this lack is not a negative experience. Rather, it is an encounter with a reserve charged with possibility. As possibility, it is that which enables life to be lived in excess without the overdose of actuality.37 What this also means is that the human is not decided. It is precisely undecidable. Undecidability means being in a position of having to decide without having already been fully determined and without being capable of bringing an end to the requirement for decision. In the realm of undecidability, decision is precisely not the mechanical application of a rule or norm. Nor is it surrender to the necessity of contingency and circumstance. Neither is it something taken blindly, without reflection and the mobilisation of what can be known. On the contrary, knowing is necessary and, indeed, integral to 'decision'. But it does not exhaust 'decision', and cannot do so if there is to be said to be such a thing as a 'decision'. We do not need deconstruction, of course, to tell us this. The management science of decision has long since known something like it through the early reflections of, for example, Herbert Simon and Geoffrey Vickers.38 But only deconstruction gives us it to think, and only deconstructively sensible philosophy thinks it through. To think decision through is to think it as heterogeneous to the field of knowing and possible knowing within which it is always located.39 And only deconstruction thinks it through to the intimate relation between 'decision' and the assumption of responsibility, which effect egress into a future that has not yet been-could not as yet have been-known: The instant of decision, if there is to be a decision, must be heterogeneous to this accumulation of knowledge. Otherwise there is no responsibility. In this sense only must the per- son taking the decision not know everything.40 Ultimately one cannot know everything because one is advancing into a future which simply cannot be anticipated, and into which one cannot see. This is no simple absence of knowing. Neither is it an economic account of the asymmetry of knowing. Nor, finally, is it a matter of calculating the logics that apply in situations of imperfect information. Here we have no mere lack of knowledge that may be remedied, calibrated, or otherwise represented mathematically and of which an account can be taken. What I am referring to is, instead, a lack integral to the structure of any and every 'decision'; where the issue precisely is not a matter of not yet knowing but of the unknowable inalienable from knowing itself. Further even, and this is the crux of the issue, it is a matter of that peculiar infinite responsibility which releases the human pneuma in respect of unknowability as such. A peculiar and quite distinctive form of responsibility thereby arises; it corresponds to the very unknowability that **invokes it. Since the unknowable is not the not yet known, but that which cannot be known in every act or exercise of knowing, it is attended by a responsibility which can similarly never be discharged**. Assumption of responsibility for this unknowability-taking it on-is what makes a 'decision' a 'decision'; rather than the application of judgment according to a rule, or the submission to the necessity of a law, however that law is decreed or described. Short of divesting the human of that very lack of measure, the assumption of which distinguishes the being of human being, this responsibility will never be discharged. Here then, too, the thinking of deconstruction reveals its profoundly ethical and political character: through its commitment to think and not elide the aporetic character of the co-presence of the ethical and the political; through its insistence on the inescapability of assuming responsibility for that immeasurable task; and through its continuous indictment of the hubristic eclipsing of undecidability by decidedness. For deconstruction is ultimately not an analytical technique. Rather, it is the event of undecidability, simply the case as Derrida puts it, taking place in every decidedness. Thus 'decision' is that which is prepared to own responsibility for undecidability. It knows that neither 'decision' nor responsibility will ever discharge each other in relation to this Otherness. Since undecidable is there- fore what 'we' are-or suffer-an ethos may arise governed by the desire continuously to make way for the immeasurable responsibility consequent upon it. Such an ethos, it may then be said-I would want to say-is what distinguishes political life. Call this self-plural, divided and hybrid, excessive and incomplete. Call it articulation, not an atom, expressed and joined by its difference from itself. Whatever is determined by this condition is no secure foundation for justice or even, ultimately, of rights. It is something more awesome, something from which these arise; the very occasion, in fact the only occasion we know, of the claim of another Justice. The human self is therefore continuously summoned the more so it responds to that insatiable injunction of which it is the expression. Such a divided self is the 'origin'-the taking place-of the call of another Justice of which its own being is the very event. Contrast how profoundly different such an account of 'origin' is from that, for example, of Rawls' "original position."4' Not a contract but the advent of the claim of another Justice is what distinguishes that event, precipitating also the way of its unfolding

#### And we’ll impact militarism – root cause of conflict

**Hossezin-Zadeh 10** [Ismael teaches economics @ Drake University, “The Biggest Parasite,” 12-17-10, http://www.counterpunch.org/2010/12/17/the-globalization-of-militarism/ DOA: 7-31-13]

Many Americans still believe that US foreign policies are designed to maintain peace, to safeguard human rights and to spread democracy around the world. Regardless of their officially stated objectives, however, those policies often lead to opposite outcomes: war, militarism and dictatorship. Evidence of the fact that US policy makers no longer uphold the ideals they state publicly is overwhelming. Those who continue to harbor illusions about the thrust of US policies around the world must be oblivious to the fact that the United States has been overtaken by a military-industrial-security-financial cabal whose representatives are firmly ensconced in both the White House and the US Congress. The ultimate goal of the cabal, according to their own military guidelines, is “**full spectrum dominance” of the world**; and they are willing to wage as many wars, to destroy as many countries and to kill as many people as necessary to achieve that goal. The liberal hawks and petty intellectual pundits who tend to defend US foreign policies on the grounds of “human rights” or “moral obligations” are well served to pay attention (among other evidence) to the US foreign policy documents that are currently being disclosed by the Wikileaks. The documents “show all too clearly that,” as Paul Craig Roberts puts it, “the US government is a duplicitous entity whose raison d’etre is to control every other country.” In essence, the documents show that while the US government, like a global mafia godfather, rewards the pliant ruling elites of the client states with arms, financial aid and military protections, it punishes the nations whose leaders refuse to surrender to the wishes of the bully and relinquish their national sovereignty. US foreign policies, like its domestic policies, are revealed as catering not to the broader public or national interests of the people but to the powerful special interests that are vested primarily in the military capital and the finance capital. US foreign policy architects are clearly incapable of recognizing or acknowledging the fact that different peoples and nations may have different needs and interests. Nor are they capable of respecting other peoples’ aspirations to national sovereignty. Instead, they tend to view other peoples, just as they do the American people, through the narrow prism of their own nefarious interests. By selfishly dividing the world into “friends” and “foe,” or “vassal states,” as Zbigniew Brzezinski put it, powerful beneficiaries of war and militarism compel both groups to embark on a path of militarization, which leads inevitably to militarism and authoritarian rule. Although militarism grows out of the military, the two are different in character. While the military is a means to meet certain ends such as maintaining national security, militarism represents a bureaucratized permanent military establishment as an end in itself. It is “a phenomenon,” as the late Chalmers Johnson put it, “by which a nation’s armed services come to put their institutional preservation ahead of achieving national security or even a commitment to the integrity of the governmental structure of which they are a part” (The Sorrows of Empire, Metropolitan Books, 2004, pp. 423-24). This explains the cancerous growth and parasitic nature of US militarism cancerous because it is steadily expanding throughout many parts of the world, and parasitic because not only does it drain other nations resources, it also sucks US national resources out of the public purse into the coffers of the wicked interests that are vested in the military-industrial-security complex. By creating fear and instability and embarking on unilateral military adventures, corporate militarism of the United States also fosters militarism elsewhere. A major US strategy of expanding its imperial influence and promoting militarism around the globe has been the formation of international military alliances in various parts of the world. These include not only the notorious North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which is essentially an integral part of the Pentagon’s world command structure, and which was recently expanded to police the world, but also 10 other joint military commands called Unified Combatant Commands. They include Africa Command (AFRICOM), Central Command (CENTCOM), European Command (EUCOM), Northern Command (NORTHCOM), Pacific Command (PACOM), and Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). The geographic area under the “protection” of each of these Unified Combatant Commands is called Area of Responsibility (AOR). AFRICOM’s area of responsibility includes US “military operations and military relations with 53 African nations – an area of responsibility covering all of Africa except Egypt.” CENTCOM’s area of responsibility spans many countries in the Middle East/Near East/Persian Gulf and Central Asia. It includes Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. EUCOM’s area of responsibility “covers 51 countries and territories, including Europe, Iceland, Greenland, and Israel.” NORTHCOM’s area of responsibility “includes air, land and sea approaches and encompasses the contiguous United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico and the surrounding water out to approximately 500 nautical miles (930 km). It also includes the Gulf of Mexico, the Straits of Florida, portions of the Caribbean region to include The Bahamas, Puerto Rico, and the US Virgin Islands.” PACOM’s area of responsibility “covers over fifty percent of the world’s surface area ? approximately 105 million square miles (nearly 272 million square kilometers) ? nearly sixty percent of the world’s population, thirty-six countries, twenty territories, and ten territories and possessions of the United States.” SOUTHCOM’s area of responsibility “encompasses 32 nations (19 in Central and South America and 13 in the Caribbean)?and 14 US and European territories. . . . It is responsible for providing contingency planning and operations in Central and South America, the Caribbean (except US commonwealths, territories, and possessions), Cuba, their territorial waters.” Together with over 800 military bases scattered over many parts of the world, this military colossus represents an ominous presence of the US armed forces all across our planet. Instead of dismantling NATO as redundant in the post-Cold War era, it has been expanded (as a proxy for the US military juggernaut) to include many new countries in Eastern Europe all the way to the borders of Russia. Not only has it inserted itself into a number of new international relations and recruited many new members and partners, it has also arrogated to itself many new tasks and responsibilities in social, political, economic, environmental, transportation and communications arenas of the world. NATO’s new areas of “responsibility,” as reflected in its latest Strategic Concept, include “human rights”; “key environmental and resource constraints, including health risks, climate change, water scarcity and increasing energy needs. . .”; “important means of communication, such as the internet, and scientific and technological research. . .”; “proliferation of ballistic missiles, of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction”; “threat of extremism, terrorism and trans-national illegal activities such as trafficking in arms, narcotics and people”; “vital communication, transport and transit routes on which international trade, energy security and prosperity depend”; the “ability to prevent, detect, defend against and recover from cyber-attacks”; and the need to “ensure that the Alliance is at the front edge in assessing the security impact of emerging technologies.” Significant global issues thus claimed to be part of NATO’s expanded mission fall logically within the purview of civilian international institutions such as the United Nations. So why is the US ruling plutocracy, using NATO, now trying to supplant the United Nations and other international agencies? The reason is that due to the rise of the influence of a number of new international players such as Brazil, South Africa, Turkey, Iran, and Venezuela the UN is no longer as subservient to the global ambitions of the United States as it once was. Planning to employ the imperial military machine of NATO instead of the civilian multilateral institutions such as the UN clearly belies, once again, the self-righteous US claims of trying to spread democracy worldwide. Furthermore, NATO’s expanded “global responsibilities” would easily provide the imperial US military machine new excuses for unilateral military interventions. By the same token, such military adventures would also provide the US military-industrial-security complex additional rationale for continued escalation of the Pentagon budget. The expansion of NATO to include most of the Eastern Europe has led Russia, which had curtailed its military spending during the 1990s in the hope that, following the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the US would also do the same, to once again increase its military spending. In response to the escalation of US military spending, which has nearly tripled during the last 10 years (from $295 billion when George W. Bush went to the White House in January 2001 to the current figure of nearly one trillion dollars), Russia too has drastically increased its military spending during the same time period (from about $22 billion in 2000 to $61 billion today). In a similar fashion, US military encirclement of China (through a number of military alliances and partnerships that range from Pakistan, Afghanistan and India to South China Sea/Southeast Asia, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, Cambodia, Malaysia, New Zealand and most recently Vietnam) has led that country to also further strengthen its military capabilities. Just as the US military and geopolitical ambitions have led **Russia and China** to reinforce their military capabilities, so have they compelled other countries such as **Iran, Venezuela and North Korea to likewise strengthen their armed forces and § Marked 17:09 § buttress their military preparedness.** Not only does aggressive US militarism compel its “adversaries” to allocate a disproportionately large share of their precious resources to military spending, but it also coerces its “allies” to likewise embark on a path of militarization. Thus, countries like Japan and Germany, whose military capabilities were reduced to purely defensive postures following the atrocities of World War II, have once again been re-militarizing in recent years under the impetus of what US military strategists call “the need to share the burden of global security.” Thus, while Germany and Japan still operate under a “peace constitution,” their military expenditures on a global scale now rank sixth and seventh, respectively (behind the US, China, France, UK and Russia). US militarization of the world (both directly through the spread of its own military apparatus across the globe and indirectly by compelling both “friends” and “foe” to militarize) has a number of ominous consequences for the overwhelming majority or the population the world. For one thing, it is the source of a largely redundant and disproportionately large allocation of the world’s precious resources to war, militarism and wasteful production of the means of death and destruction. Obviously, as this inefficient, class-biased disbursement of resources drains public finance and accumulates national debt, it also brings tremendous riches and treasures to war profiteers, that is, the beneficiaries of the military capital and the finance capital. Secondly, to justify this lopsided allocation of the lion’s share of national resources to military spending, **beneficiaries of war dividends tend to create fear, suspicion and hostility among peoples and nations of the world, thereby sowing the seeds of war, international conflicts and global instability. Thirdly**, by the same token that powerful beneficiaries of war and military-security capital tend to promote suspicion, to create fear and invent enemies, both at home and abroad, **they also undermine democratic values and nurture authoritarian rule.** As the predatory military-industrial-security-financial interests find democratic norms of openness and transparency detrimental to their nefarious objectives of limitless self-enrichment, they cleverly create pretexts for secrecy, “security,” military rule and police state. Concealment of the robbery of public treasury in the name of national security requires restriction of information, obstruction of transparency, and curtailment of democracy. It follows that under the kleptocratic influence of the powerful interests that are vested in the military-security-financial industries the US government has turned into an ominous global force of destabilization, obstruction, retrogression and authoritarianism.

### **Overview**

#### Extend Graham shaw and akter – modern society calculates the world as a target – the only question is who to kill not whether – and Dillon indicates this calculation of human life makes all life numerically equivalent and therefore subject to universal devaluation – that culminates in extinction – means we control the internal to their impacts

### Root cause

#### Prefer specificity – Dillon says you have to devalue people to kill them, Cuomo says you have to accept the military to go to war, hossezin says militarism makes threats real – means aff does solve for war – we don’t need to solve for a root cause because we universally solve the proximate causes.

### Ethics

#### We are better consequentialists – util justifies precision bombing – means they have no answer to militarism – only a moral relationship to the other solves – that’s wilcox

#### And util isn’t an ethic – only a calculation of facts – that’s amoral because a computer could do it – means they have no moral framework and no reason to vote – that’s Dillon

### Kritik

#### Conditionality encourages shallow unfair debates – they’ll race to the under-covered position - deters good answers because they’ll just cross apply them – and reject the team – can’t reject the argument – voter for fairness and education

#### Case outweighs – that’s on the case debate – we access the root cause of conflict that comes from the devaluation of human life – means we outweigh on magnitude because we control the necessary condition to extinction – that’s dillon

#### And that’s the root cause of oppression – our Cuomo evidence indicates that regardless of the type of hierarchy – hierarchy exists and must be challenged – means we solve the root cause of the cap k because we challenge hierarchy in general – negative can only reentrench

#### History proves capitalism isn’t the root of conflict

McKenzie 3 (D. W., Graduate Student in Economics – George Mason University, “Does Capitalism Require War?”, http://www.mises.org/story/1201)

Perhaps the oddest aspect of these various, but similar, claims is that their proponents appeal so often to historical examples. They often claim that history shows how capitalism is imperialistic and warlike or at least benefits from war. Capitalism supposedly needs a boost from some war spending from time to time, and history shows this. Robert Higgs demonstrated that the wartime prosperity during the Second World War was illusory.. This should come to no surprise to those who lived through the deprivations of wartime rationing. We do not need wars for prosperity, but does capitalism breed war and imperialism anyway? History is rife with examples of imperialism. The Romans, Alexander, and many others of the ancient world waged imperialistic wars. The Incan Empire and the empire of Ancient China stand as examples of the universal character of imperialism. Who could possibly claim that imperialism grew out of the prosperity of these ancient civilizations? Imperialism precedes modern industrial capitalism by many centuries. Uneven wealth distribution or underconsumption under capitalism obviously did not cause these instances of imperialism. Of course, this fact does not prove that modern capitalism lacks its own imperialistic tendencies The notion that income gets underspent or maldistributed lies at the heart of most claims that capitalism either needs or produces imperialistic wars. As J.B. Say argued, supply creates its own demand through payments to factors of production. Demand Side economists Hobson and Keynes argued that there would be too little consumption and too little investment for continuous full employment. We save too much to have peace and prosperity. The difficulty we face is not in oversaving, but in underestimating the workings of markets and the desires of consumers. Doomsayers have been downplaying consumer demand for ages. As demand side economist J.K. Galbraith claimed, we live in an affluent society, where most private demands have been met. Of course, Hobson made the same claim much earlier. Earlier and stranger still, mercantilists claimed that 'wasteful acts' such as tea drinking, gathering at alehouses, taking snuff, and the wearing of ribbons were unnecessary luxuries that detracted from productive endeavors. The prognostications of esteemed opponents of capitalism have consistently failed to predict consumer demand. Today, consumers consume at levels that few long ago could have imagined possible. There is no reason to doubt that consumers will continue to press for ever higher levels of consumption. Though it is only a movie, Brewster's Millions illustrates how creative people can be at spending money. People who do actually inherit, win, or earn large sums of money have little trouble spending it. Indeed, wealthy individuals usually have more trouble holding on to their fortunes than in finding ways to spend them. We are never going to run out of ways to spend money. Many of the complaints about capitalism center on how people save too much. One should remember that there really is no such thing as saving. Consumers defer consumption to the future only. As economist Eugen Böhm-Bawerk demonstrated, people save according to time preference. Savings diverts resources into capital formation. This increases future production. Interest enhanced savings then can purchase these goods as some consumers cease to defer their consumption. Keynes' claim that animal spirits drive investment has no rational basis. Consumer preferences are the basis for investment. Investors forecast future consumer demand. Interest rates convey knowledge of these demands. The intertemporal coordination of production through capital markets and interest rates is not a simple matter. But Keynes' marginal propensities to save and Hobson's concentration of wealth arguments fail to account for the real determinants of production through time.…. Capitalism neither requires nor promotes imperialist expansion. Capitalism did not create imperialism or warfare. Warlike societies predate societies with secure private property. The idea that inequity or underspending give rise to militarism lacks any rational basis. Imperialistic tendencies exist due to ethnic and nationalistic bigotries, and the want for power. Prosperity depends upon our ability to prevent destructive acts. The dogma of destructive creation fails as a silver lining to the cloud of warfare. Destructive acts entail real costs that diminish available opportunities. The idea that we need to find work for idle hands in capitalism at best leads to a kind of Sisyphus economy where unproductive industries garner subsidies from productive people. At worst, it serves as a supporting argument for war. The more recent versions of the false charges against capitalism do nothing to invalidate two simple facts. Capitalism generates prosperity by creating new products. War inflicts poverty by destroying existing wealth. There is no sound reason to think otherwise.

#### Perm do the affirmative and affirm their critique of capitalism - we are the critique because we are a challenge to hierarchy in general – that subsumes their critique of capitalism

#### Two net benefits

#### We are resistance within the system – our lauritsen evidence indicates that we can challenge democratic deficits by agititating for principles of democracy – doesn’t mean we have to unproblematically affirm the state or capitalism – you should support all forms of resistance as positive steps in the right direction

Robinson and Tormey 6 (Andrew, Leverhulme Trust Early Career Fellow in the School of Politics – University of Nottingham and Simon, Professor of Politics and Critical Theory and Head of the School of Politics – University of Nottingham, “Zizek’s Marx: ‘Sublime Object’ or a ‘Plague of Fantasies’?”, Historical Materialism, 14(3))

Thinking, fourthly, about the formal characteristics of revolutionary action, Marx is never dismissive (as Zizek is) of resistance, no matter how ‘petty’ or poorly co-ordinated. Marx, that is, does not prejudge the adequacy or effectiveness of political action from the standpoint of an abstract model of praxis (the Act), which is then used to dismiss or endorse the efforts of those resisting. Thus, ‘the Communists do not set up sectarian principles of their own, by which to shape and mould the proletarian movement’.126 This means that they are prepared to act in whatever way to advance the interests of the working class and any other social forces who are acting in a revolutionary way.127 Even utopians, about whom Marx can be dismissive, offer something more than a mere ‘supplement’ of capitalism. Indeed, as he notes in the Manifesto, utopias are ‘full of the most valuable materials for the enlightenment of the working class’.128 For Marx, therefore, resistances that stop short of revolution, and even seem purely ‘phantasmatic’, are, although inadequate, a step forward that should be supported by all means.

#### Subpoint a - Solves better – using capitalism to fight itself is more effective

Rothkrug 90 (Paul, Founder – Environmental Rescue Fund, Monthly Review, March, 41(10), p. 38)

No institution is or ever has been a seamless monolith. Although the inherent mechanism of American capitalism is as you describe it, oriented solely to profit without regard to social consequences, this does not preclude significant portions of that very system from joining forces with the worldwide effort for the salvation of civilization, perhaps even to the extent of furnishing the margin of success for that very effort.

#### Subpoint b that breaks down absolutist divisions and checks violence

Levin 98 (Richard, President – Yale, “"Activist Politics" and/or the Job Crisis in the Humanities”, The Minnesota Review, 48/49, http://www.theminnesotareview.org/journal/ns48/levin.htm)

As a result of this view of the world, many people on the far right and far left are single-causers; they believe not only that everything the demon does has bad effects in our society, but also that everything bad in our society is caused by this demon. Right-wing extremists hold feminism or secular humanism or ZOG responsible for drugs, crime, floridation, and the decline of "family values," and many leftists—including some appearing in mr—claim that capitalism is the cause of racism and sexism (Cotter 119-21, Lewis 97-98, Young 288-91). This, in turn, leads to the belief that there's a single cure, and only this one cure, for all these social ills: the complete extirpation of the demon that causes them and the complete transformation of society. Thus extremists on both sides tend to be all-or-nothingists, to reject all reforms as "band-aids" that are doomed to fail since they don't get at the source of our problems and so won't further this radical transformation (Neilson/Meyerson 45: 268-69). Many are also millenarians who believe the transformation will be brought about by an apocalyptic clash between the forces of good and evil ending in the permanent defeat of the demon and the creation of a utopia(for fundamentalists this is a literal Armageddon and Second Coming, for militias it's RaHoWa (Racial Holy War) or the uprising of true patriots against our traitorous government foretold in The Turner Diaries with its Hitlerian "final solution," and for Marxists it's the proletarian revolution that, their anthem tells us, will be "the final conflict." Another consequence of their polarization is that partisans at both extremes try to eliminate the intermediate positions between them, often by denying their differences. Neilson and Meyerson say that "we should see liberalism and conservatism as flipsides" (45: 269) and argue that Republicans and Democrats are really the same (47: 242), as does Tom Lewis at greater length (89-90). Similarly, George Wallace, in his racist, third-party campaign, insisted that "there isn't a dime's worth of difference between them." More sinister is their tendency to "disappear" these intermediate positions by equating them with the opposite extreme. McCarthy and his followers attacked Democrats and even liberal Republicans as "pinkos" and "fellow travelers," and Marxist regimes condemned social democrats and even communists who deviated from the party line as fascist counterrevolutionaries who must be liquidated. Some extremists on the academic left employ this tactic against moderates and liberals, although with less lethal results. The same Marxist critic who called me a "self-confessed liberal" also called me, in another essay published in the same year, a "reactionary" ("Terminator" 64), and Donald Morton and Mas'ud Zavarzadeh consign Gerald Graff, Stanley Fish, Richard Rorty, and Andrew Ross to the same camp as Rush Limbaugh (32-33). (Neilson and Meyerson's attack on Bérubé is more restrained--the worst thing they call him is a "liberal pluralist" [45: 267, 47: 239, 245]; but they try to connect him, as I noted, to support of the far right in Central America.) Such people need a simplistic division of the political world into two polar opposites with no awkward alternatives (just as they need a simplistic explanation of the cause and cure of all our problems), because they can't tolerate complexity or uncertainty. That mental set, I believe, is the most significant similarity (or "equivalence") between the far right and far left.

#### Aff catalyzes a broader movement against militarism and violence by bringing attention to the other that’s butler and understanding the way that all of us are complicit in war – that’s Cuomo - We are universal call to action, and class-based politics are equally prone to cooption

Laclau 00 (Ernesto, Professor of Comparative Literature – University of Buffalo, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality, p. 292)

(i) Zizek thinks that the degree of globality or universality of a struggle depends on its location in the social structure: some struggles conceived as ‘class struggle’ – those of the workers, especially – would spontaneously and tendentially be more ‘universal’ in their effects because they take place at the ‘root’ of the capitalist system; while others, more ‘cultural’ in their aims – such as multicultural ones – would be more prone to particularism and, as a result, easier to integrate into the present system of domination. For me, this is a spurious distinction. There is no struggle which has inscribed in itself the guarantee of being the privilege locus of universalistic political effects. Workers’ demands – higher wages, shorter working hours, better conditions in the workplaces, and so on – can, given the appropriate circumstances, be as easily integrated into the system as those of any other group. Conversely, given the globalization of capitalism, dislocations could take place which are at the basis of anti-systemic movements led by groups who are not directly part of capitalist relations of production. So while for Zizek the distinction between ‘class struggle’ and what he calls ‘postmodernism’ is fundamental, I tend to blur it.

#### ****Aff key to alt solvency – state of emergency is a state tactic to stop revolution****

**Zizek 02**

(London review of Books, vol 24 # 10)

Such paradoxes also provide the key to the way in which the liberal-totalitarian emergency represented by the 'war on terror' relates to the authentic revolutionary state of emergency, first articulated by St Paul in his reference to the 'end of time'. When a state institution proclaims a state of emergency, it does so by definition as part of a desperate strategy to avoid the true emergency and return to the 'normal course of things'. It is, you will recall, a feature of all reactionary proclamations of a 'state of emergency' that they were directed against popular unrest ('confusion') and presented as a resolve to restore normalcy. In Argentina, in Brazil, in Greece, in Chile, in Turkey, the military who proclaimed a state of emergency did so in order to curb the 'chaos' of overall politicisation. In short, reactionary proclamations of a state of emergency are in actuality a desperate defence against the real state of emergency.

#### 2. Framework- the role of the ballot is to weigh the plan against the status quo or a competitive policy option

#### Net benefits-

#### First- Fairness- they moot the entirety of the 1ac, makes it impossible to be affirmative – alternative frameworks are unpredictable and infinitely regressive

#### Second – Education- debates about the 1AC are vital to topic specific education

#### Extend the second Dillon evidence – we have an infinite moral obligation to the other – means that the negative can’t solve because it requires the rejection of our reaching out to the other – only permutation solves because it’s not partial.

#### Only the affirmative gives a moral connection to the other –– that’s our Dillon evidence – we need responsiveness to the specific situation of people dieing from drone warfare – anything else is abstract principle - means we are the precondition to the kritik

#### And alt alone is worse -

#### rejecting ‘partial struggles’ creates political nihilism – nothing meets Zizek’s criteria

Laclau 4 (Ernesto, Professor of Political Theory – University of Essex and Visiting Professor of Comparative Literature – SUNY-Buffalo, Umbr(a): War, p. 33-34)

Here we reach the crux of the difficulties to be found in Zizek. On the one hand, he is committed to a theory of the full revolutionary act that would operate in its own name, without being invested in any object outside itself. On the other hand, the capitalist system, as the dominating, underlying mechanism, is the reality with which the emancipatory act has to break. The conclusion from both premises is that there is no valid emancipatory struggle except one that is fully and directly anti-capitalist. In his words: “I believe in the central structuring role of the anti-capitalist struggle.” The problem, however, is this: he gives no indication of what an anti-capitalist struggle might be. Zizek quickly dismisses multicultural, anti-sexist, and anti-racist struggles as not being directly anti-capitalist. Nor does he sanction the traditional aims of the Left, linked more directly to the economy: the demands for higher wages, for industrial democracy, for control of the labor process, for a progressive distribution of income, are not proposed as anti-capitalist either. Does he imagine that the Luddites’ proposal to destroy all the machines would bring an end to capitalism? Not a single line in Zizek’s work gives an example of what he considers an anti-capitalist struggle. One is left wondering whether he is anticipating an invasion of beings from another planet, or as he once suggested, some kind of ecological catastrophe that would not transform the world but cause it to fall apart. So where has the whole argument gone wrong? In its very premises. Since Zizek refuses to apply the hegemonic logic to strategico-political thought, he is stranded in a blind alley. He has to dismiss all “partial” struggles as internal to the “system” (whatever that means), and the “Thing” being unachievable, he is left without any concrete historical actor for his anti-capitalist struggle. Conclusion: Zizek cannot provide any theory of the emancipatory subject. At the same time, since his systemic totality, being a ground, is regulated exclusively by its own internal laws, the only option is to wait for these laws to produce the totality of its effects. Ergo: political nihilism.

#### and

#### backlash

Generic 7 (James, Temple University, Review of “Getting Free”, Wooden Shoe Book Collective, 12-6, http://www.woodenshoebooks.org/reviews/review31.htm)

Herod suggests that people set up employee associations, involving no larger unions, in the fight in the workplace. In the fight for the neighborhood, neighborhood associations should be formed to bring control back to the neighbors away from the government. In the household, several families should pool their resources together to get a larger place that they can all share. Herod then goes into many suggestions in basic things people can do to make this better world, like setting a meeting hall, organizing worker-owned businesses, try to get jobs in the neighborhoods, set up local currency, growing food locally, setting up neighborhood warehouse for goods, slowing down work at jobs, turning off television, recovering language away from academia, ending cooperation with the police, putting your money in local cooperative banks, breaking away from the school system, as well as rejecting a host of other things like recycling, marriage by church or state, suits, and voting, and saying not to be come a boss, bureaucrat, or a cop. All of these steps sound pretty good, and the author argues them pretty well. I like most of the stuff in here and I defiantly like how he avoids abstractions whenever possible like "capitalism, the state, etc" and in general you don't need a dictionary to get exactly what he means. I do have a few small problems with the theory though. He's against involving unions in workplace struggles, instead going for just worker organizations, which sounds nice and pure because it avoids the union bureaucracy that often chokes the labor movement, however, I would be concerned about what exactly to do when facing inevitable backlash from the bosses. Sometimes you really can't beat the resources a larger union offers, in fighting the union-busting law-firms, government forces, and intimidation from management. I'm also a little hazy on what he wants to do in general once government or right-wing thugs try to roll back the gains he's talking about. You also do have to look at stuff like race and gender and sexuality in dealing with all this because it's such a deep part of our culture. Capitalists are very resourceful and do not hesitate to adapt to situations, with "speak softly and carry a big stick" tactics. Besides those small disagreements, I really think that "Getting Free" is very well thought out. Sometimes it's a little pie-in-the-sky, but most theories are, and the best thing is to take what you can use out of theories and disregard what you can't. If you're looking for some great present-day anarchist theories on practical things on what to do, pick this one up. You'll be very glad you did, because it's wonderfully written, funny, to the point, and you get the feeling you're reading the work of a very quick-witted person.

#### And no critical mass for revolution

Grossberg 92 (Lawrence, Professor of Communication Studies – UNC-Chapel Hill and Chair of the Executive Committee of the University Program in Cultural Studies, We Gotta Get Out of This Place: Popular Conservatism and Postmodern Culture, p. 388-389)

If it is capitalism that is at stake, our moral opposition to it has to be tempered by the realities of the world and the possibilities of political change. Taking a simple negative relation to it, as if the moral condemnation of the evil of capitalism were sufficient (granting that it does establish grotesque systems of inequality and oppression), is not likely to establish a viable political agenda. First, it is not at all clear what it would mean to overthrow capitalism in the current situation. Unfortunately, despite our desires, "the masses" are not waiting to be led into revolution, and it is not simply a case of their failure to recognize their own best interests, as if we did. Are we to decide-rather undemocratically, I might add-to overthrow capitalism in spite of their legitimate desires? Second, as much as capitalism is the cause of many of the major threats facing the world, at the moment it may also be one of the few forces of stability, unity and even, within limits, a certain "civility" in the world. The world system is, unfortunately, simply too precarious and the alternative options not all that promising. Finally, the appeal of an as yet unarticulated and even unimagined future, while perhaps powerful as a moral imperative, is simply too weak in the current context to effectively organize people, and too vague to provide any direction.

#### And they’ll say cooption but reject the fear of cooption – small reforms can have huge system-altering consequences

Zizek 98 (Slavoj, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Social Studies, Ljubljana, Law and the Postmodern Mind, p. 91-92)

Finally, the point about inherent transgression is not that every opposition, every attempt at subversion, is automatically "coopted". On the contrary, the very fear of being coopted that makes us search for more and more "radical," "pure" attitudes, is the supreme strategy of suspension or marginalization. The point is rather that true subversion is not always where it seems to be. Sometimes, a small distance is much more explosive for the system than an ineffective radical rejection. In religion, a small heresy can be more threatening than an outright atheism or passage to another religion: for a hard-line Stalinist, a Trotskyite is infinitely more threatening than a bourgeois liberal or social democrat. As le Carre put it, one true revisionist in the Central Committee is worth more than thousand dissidents outside it. It was easy to dismiss Gorbachev for aiming only at improving the system, making it more efficient-he nonetheless set in motion its disintegration. So one should also bear in mind the obverse of the inherent transgression: one is tempted to paraphrase Freud's claim from The Ego and the Id that man is not only much more immoral than he believes, but also much more moral than he knows-the System is not only infinitely more resistant and invulnerable than it may appear (it can coopt apparently subversive strategies, they can serve as its support), it is also infinitely more vulnerable (a small revision etc, can have large unforeseen catastrophic consequences**)**.

#### K alone not enough – only part of the picture – doesn’t express the world’s complexity – only the affirmative gives our moral thesis weight.

**Cuomo, 2003** [Chris, Director of Woman Studies at the University of Georgia, “The Philosopher Queen, Feminist Essays on War, Love and Knowledge,” 48-50]

Discourses of complexity are powerful antidotes to views that reduce all truths to linear equations or rock-bottom simple facts about the world, such as the view that the best science of mind describes chemical processes in the brain. Other reductions such as the view that to be human is to be rational (only), to live is to be selfish (only), or that organisms and processes are constituted by solid borders and are therefore completely knowable apart from the systems that support them, cannot survive analyses that take seriously a world of difference, chaos, and vastly complicated interrelatedness.

Although complexity theorists in the sciences argue against scientific approaches that aim to reduce complex truths to simple truths an emphasis on complexity is not meant to be a rejection of simple truths, or the pattern-seeking investigations through which they are constructed. Complexity theorists see the discovery of a simple truth as an invitation to investigate broad new questions, because there is always a wider context into which a new, simply expressible discovery must be incorporated to become useful knowledge. Fruitful paths of inquiry are forged through curiosity about relationships between simple truths and complex realities. Theories that recognize complexity therefore can include bottom-line theories to which reductionists cling. When they describe reality well, simple equations capture something that is unifyingly true about the world, like 2+2=4, “Organic beings have basic chemical requirements for health,” “Where race or gender are present, oppression is often found,” or “A rose is a rose is a rose.” Simple equations can capture facts that are as universally true as it is possible to be.

But a simple equation never captures a truth that is the only thing we need to know about what it describes. Simple truths always leave remainders, and so knowing a simple truth about something – even a profound simple truth – always leaves us with only part of the story. Statements about the beauty of roses tell us nothing about pollination. Unless you know the mass of the planet you’re on, you won’t be able to calculate the gravitational force, even if you understand Einstein’s theory of general relativity. If you know the chemical composition of a thing, but don’t know how it tastes, you cannot make a good judgment about whether it is good food. Knowing one powerful truth about human behavior is most useful when it is considered in relation to many other things. Without such integration, simple truths are ~~blinding~~ limiting rather than illuminating.

Perhaps the strongest arguments against reductionist approach is the incredible complexity of the physical world, and its nexus with human life. Appreciating complexity includes not only stressing the extent to which the world is complicated, but also that the subjects and objects of observance, experience, and study are many-layered, changing, and rather unpredictable. Complexity theorists more accurately reflect experience, because they describe reality as more like a Navajo rug, and less like a linear equation. Thinking about complexity is powerful, because it is so deeply resonant, despite the scholastic difficulties of adequately capturing such analyses in equations of words.

#### And proximate causes first, acting to save the other is the height of our affective moral being – precedes all other normative claims.

Cohen 2006 [Richard A., “Levinas: Thinking Least about Death: Contra Heidegger,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 60, No. 1/3, Dec., 2006, 35-6, Accessed via Jstor]

8 Morality: dying for the other

But there is another side to death: if all death comes as murder, it is not only my death that comes as murder, so too does the other's death come as murder. And this consideration brings us to the ultimate sense of death, which lies not in my suffering or even in my dying, but rather derives from the primacy of the other person that we have already detected in the futurity of death, and the manner in which dying remains a social event. For Levinas, it is not my mortality and suffering that come first, but rather and precisely the mortality and suffering of the other.  
Death remains a social event, and sociality is, in Levinas's view, initiated in the primacy of the ethical, initiated, that is to say, in the primacy of the other person. So, considering the meaning of death, the death that remains social and hence ethical, the primary directive, the over-riding moral imperative is to alleviate the suffering of the other, the one whose mortality comes first. The imperative of the face of the other, Levinas writes, "commands me to not remain indifferent to this death, to not let the Other die alone, that is, to answer for the life of the other person, at the risk of becoming an accomplice in that person's death."13 If the face of the other, as Levinas has taught, first appears in the imperative "Thou shall not murder," then to not murder the other I must tend to the other's suffering, to the other's mortality, and do everything in my means to avert the violence which produces the death of the other. "Thou shall not murder" means the "face" of the other person, as all readers of Levinas know, but it means this not as an abstract and remote command, but as the concrete requirement, the command, to support the life, to alleviate the pain and suffering, and to forestall the dying of the other.

And the most extreme meaning, indeed, the paradigmatic meaning of "Thou shall not murder," in the sense of caring for the mortal other's suffering, is captured in the extreme formula that Levinas invokes in his later writings: "dying for the other." One can not only sacrifice one's own money, and time, and needs to alleviate the other's suffering, but one can be called to make the ultimate sacrifice for the other, the ultimate self-sacrifice, to give (as we say) one's life for the life of the other. This extreme notion, which of course is not simply an idea, is no idle fancy either, for it is precisely what all but a handful of war heroes have actually done, or, as Merleau-Ponty put the point shortly after the end of World War II: "The heroes are all dead."

It is in the moral extremity of this notion, "dying for the other," that Levinas finds the ultimate sense of mortality, and perhaps also the ultimate sense of morality, living for and caring for others - "to not let the other die alone." Levinas will invoke this sense to understand the very humanity of the human. As he writes in his 1988 article entitled "Dying for...": "[T]he human, in which worry over the death of the other comes before care for self. The humanness of dying for the other would be the very meaning of love in its responsibility for one's fellow~~man~~ and, perhaps, the primordial inflection of the affective as such" (Levinas, 1998, p. 216). Here is yet another citation from the same article. (But it is not the last word.)

The priority of the other over the I, by which the human being-there is chosen and unique, is precisely the latter's response to the nakedness of the face and its mortality. It is there that the concern for the other's death is realized, and that "dying for ~~him,~~" "dying his death" takes priority over "authentic" death. Not a post-mortem life, but the excessiveness of sacrifice, holiness in charity and mercy. This future of death in the present of love is probably one of the original secrets of temporality itself and beyond all metaphor (Levinas, 1998, p. 217).

#### That is a disad to the kritik – their a-contextual reading of feminist epistemologies dulls our moral responsiveness - means that negative can’t solve for violence – that’s Dillon and Butler

#### U.S. capitalism is sustainable

Galston 9 (William, Senior Fellow in governance studies @ Brookings, "Is Capitalism Dead? No," 3-11, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=101693244)

As the New Deal took shape, Franklin Roosevelt was accused of undermining capitalism. His response was that he was saving capitalism, not least from itself. And he turned out to be right. Today, in the midst of another economic crisis, cries of "socialism" once again abound. **There is every reason to believe that these charges, too, will prove to be overwrought**. Even if all of Barack Obama's proposals were adopted, **the United States would remain a capitalist country**.

#### Kritik is uniquely devaluing – applies the cost benefit analysis of solvency and competition to the affirmative and your decision making process – that turns the aff because it entrenches a worse capitalist logic -

**Kelman, 81** [Steven, Albert J. Weatherhead III and Richard W. Weatherhead Professor of Public Management at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, “Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique” AEI Journal on Government and Society Regulation, 33-40]

Finally, one may oppose the effort to place prices on a non-market thing and hence in effect incorporate it into the market system out of a fear that the very act of doing so will reduce the thing's perceived value. To place a price on the benefit may, in other words, reduce the value of that benefit. Cost-benefit analysis thus may be like the thermometer that, when placed in a liquid to be measured, itself changes the liquid's temperature. Examples of the perceived cheapening of a thing's value by the very act of buying and selling it abound in everyday life and language. The disgust that accompanies the idea of buying and selling human beings is based on the sense that this would dramatically diminish human worth. Epithets such as "he prostituted himself," applied as linguistic analogies to people who have sold something, reflect the view that certain things should not be sold because doing so diminishes their value. Praise that is bought is worth little, even to the person buying it. A true anecdote is told of an economist who retired to another university community and complained that he was having difficulty making friends. The laconic response of a critical colleague-"If you want a friend why don't you buy yourself one"-illustrates in a pithy way the intuition that, for some things, the very act of placing a price on them reduces their perceived value.

The first reason that pricing something de- creases its perceived value is that, in many circumstances, non-market exchange is associated with the production of certain values not associated with market exchange. These may include spontaneity and various other feelings that come from personal relationships. If a good becomes less associated with the production of positively valued feelings because of market exchange, the perceived value of the good declines to the extent that those feelings are valued. This can be seen clearly in instances where a thing may be transferred both by market and by non-market mechanisms. The willingness to pay for sex bought from a prostitute is less than the perceived value of the sex con- summating love. (Imagine the reaction if a practitioner of cost-benefit analysis computed the benefits of sex based on the price of prostitute services.)

Furthermore, if one values in a general sense the existence of a non-market sector be- cause of its connection with the production of certain valued feelings, then one ascribes added value to any non-marketed good simply as a repository of values represented by the non- market sector one wishes to preserve. This seems certainly to be the case for things in nature, such as pristine streams or undisturbed forests: for many people who value them, part of their value comes from their position as repositories of values the non-market sector represents.

#### And the totalizing nature of their kritik murders our subjectivity – is the sovereign violence we kritik

Cohen 2006 [Richard A., “Levinas: Thinking Least about Death: Contra Heidegger,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 60, No. 1/3, Dec., 2006, 33-4, Accessed via Jstor]

6 The grim reaper

It is at this point that our attention must be drawn to something quite astonishing that Levinas saw as early as Time and the Other, namely, the idea that 11time itself is neither objective nor subjective but is intersubjective, something we have just heard in the citations above taken from Totality and Infinity, in which Levinas has spoken of the time of postponement as a "time to be for the Other," or, even more directly, when he writes that such time "is the mode of existence and reality of a separated being that has entered into relation with the Other." Death is not only a future that always comes but never arrives; its transcendence is like nothing so much as, is tantamount to, is as if it were the approach of another human being. I cite another longer passage by Levinas from Totality and Infinity which makes this same point even more pointedly.

In the being for death of fear I am not faced with nothingness, but faced with what is against me, as though murder, rather than being one of the occasions of dying, were inseparable from the essence of death, as though the approach of death remained one of the modalities of the relation with the Other. The violence of death threatens as a tyranny, as though proceeding from a foreign will. The order of necessity that is carried out in death is not like an implacable law of determinism governing a totality, but is rather like the alienation of my will by the Other (TI, p. 234).

Before explicating this description of death as like another human being approaching, and hence death as if coming like murder, let me first focus more narrowly on Levinas's use of the expression "as though." It does not at all simply indicate a simile or metaphor. It has rather to do with Levinas's manner of doing phenomenology, and occurs in many places in Levinas's work. To understand the meaning of a term, any term, Levinas seeks out its most extreme sense. For instance, to understand the feeling of entrapment or enclosure, which we mentioned earlier with regard to the meaning of suffering, it is not enough to invoke the phenomena of claustrophobia, say, which leaves open the possible misinterpretation that one is merely pyschologizing. One must rather seek out where or how this feeling originally gains the full force of its signification; one must search for more extreme forms of entrapment. For Levinas such a deeper sense derives from the way the body is encumbered with itself. And here, too, one can go farther. In his early article entitled "On Escape," Levinas will say that the body's nausea with itself derives its ultimate significance as an encounter with being, as that beyond which one feels it is impossible to go, an existence without escape, without exit. Being is encountered as that which has no exits, the ultimate trap, the ultimate enclosure, and it is from this meaning of being, being as entrapment or enclosure, that all "lesser" senses of enclosure, for instance "claustrophobia," gain their sense by near or far derivation. So, as a general rule of phenomenological investigation, for Levinas it is from the most extreme meaning of a signification, the one without any presuppositions, that the lesser meanings of that same signification derive their meaning. And this is why Levinas sees in the futurity of death – murder.

It is an important transition, so let us review it carefully. We have seen that death is first intimated in pain, as a fear, as an intimation of an extremity of the doubling over of pain. It is experienced as that which lies over the border of an extreme passivity as an ever more extreme passivity to the point of a never-experienced but feared massive inertness. A living being, however much it may suffer, is never dead. Its passivity has limits. A body is not a corpse. Death never arrives. It always remains future. It transcends the present, opens up a meantime wherein everything meaningful occurs. But, the phenomenologist must ask a further question, hence Levinas must ask, what does it mean really to say that something never arrives into the self-presence of the self, that it remains always future? Is this signification ultimate, irreducible, presuppositionless? And if it is not, from whence does the futurity of the future derive its sense? It is because he approaches meaning in this way that we can understand the justification for Levinas's answer: the transcendence of death as futurity makes sense, or takes it sense from the even more transcendent futurity of the other person. Death is thus like, or as though, or tantamount to, the transcendence of the oncoming futurity of another person. Thus death comes like murder. And with this signification we shift from phenomenology to ethics, because for Levinas inter-subjectivity, the relation to the other person, my relation to you, is first significant as an ethical relation. Nothing could be farther from the ontological analysis of Heidegger which left ethics and other persons behind as merely ontic or inauthentic.

#### And perm do both - our Cuomo evidence indicates that attention to the conditions and presence of sovereign violence catalyzes longer term movements against violence – means we subsume their kritik because we are a coalitional struggle

#### And that resolves residual links – we can agree on emotional opposition to war and still be different people – best solvency – brings both perspectives to the table – that’s the Ibanez and iniguez evidence.

## Framework

#### We meet – we defend topical action

#### And counter interpretation – debate is whether we should adopt the stem of the sentence that follows the colon

#### Resolved is to come to a definite decision about USfg action. Implies subject that is resolved

Dictionary.com [“resolved” http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/resolved]

re·solve   [ri-zolv] Show IPA verb, re·solved, re·solv·ing, noun

verb (used with object)

to come to a definite or earnest decision about; determine (to do something): I have resolved that I shall live to the full.

#### And colon means the object of resolution modifies the word resolved, subject can’t be USFG must be the debaters who do the resolving

Dictionary.com [“colon” http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/colon]

co·lon1    [koh-luhn] Show IPA

noun, plural co·lons for 1, co·la  [-luh] Show IPA for 2.

1.

the sign (:) used to mark a major division in a sentence, to indicate that what follows is an elaboration, summation, implication, etc., of what precedes; or to separate groups of numbers referring to different things, as hours from minutes in 5:30; or the members of a ratio or proportion, as in 1 : 2 = 3 : 6.

#### That means their framework has resolutional grounding

#### And prefer our framework -

#### Simulation precludes recognition of our own complicity and participation in violence – destroys individual agency

**Kappeler 95** Associate Professor at Al-Akhawayn University (Susanne, The Will to Violence, p. 10-11)

We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of `collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equival­ent of a universal acquittal.' On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective `assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility leading to the well-known illusion of our apparent `powerlessness’ and its accompanying phe­nomenon, our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens even more so those of other nations have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina or Somalia since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgement, and thus into underrating the respons­ibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls `organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually or­ganized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major powermongers: For we tend to think that we cannot `do' anything, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of `What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as `virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like `I want to stop this war', `I want military intervention', `I want to stop this backlash', or `I want a moral revolution." 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our `non-comprehension’: our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we `are' the war in our `unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the `fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don't' our readiness, in other words, to build ident­ities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the `others'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape `our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence.

#### -- Exclusively focusing on policymaking crowds outs critical questioning.

Biswas 7 [Shampa, Professor of Politics – Whitman College, “Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist”, Millennium, 36(1), p. 117-125]

It has been 30 years since Stanley Hoffman accused IR of being an ‘American social science’ and noted its too close connections to US foreign policy elites and US preoccupations of the Cold War to be able to make any universal claims,7 yet there seems to be a curious amnesia and lack of curiosity about the political history of the discipline, and in particular its own complicities in the production of empire.8 Through what discourses the imperial gets reproduced, resurrected and re-energised is a question that should be very much at the heart of a discipline whose task it is to examine the contours of global power. Thinking this failure of IR through some of Edward Said’s critical scholarly work from his long distinguished career as an intellectual and activist, this article is an attempt to politicise and hence render questionable the disciplinary traps that have, ironically, circumscribed the ability of scholars whose very business it is to think about global politics to actually think globally and politically. What Edward Said has to offer IR scholars, I believe, is a certain kind of global sensibility, a critical but sympathetic and felt awareness of an inhabited and cohabited world. Furthermore, it is a profoundly political sensibility whose globalism is predicated on a cognisance of the imperial and a firm non-imperial ethic in its formulation. I make this argument by travelling through a couple of Said’s thematic foci in his enormous corpus of writing. Using a lot of Said’s reflections on the role of public intellectuals, I argue in this article that IR scholars need to develop what I call a ‘global intellectual posture’. In the 1993 Reith Lectures delivered on BBC channels, Said outlines three positions for public intellectuals to assume – as an outsider/exile/marginal, as an ‘amateur’, and as a disturber of the status quo speaking ‘truth to power’ and self-consciously siding with those who are underrepresented and disadvantaged.9 Beginning with a discussion of Said’s critique of ‘professionalism’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ as it applies to International Relations, I first argue the importance, for scholars of global politics, of taking *politics* seriously. Second, I turn to Said’s comments on the posture of exile and his critique of identity politics, particularly in its nationalist formulations, to ask what it means for students of global politics to take the *global* seriously. Finally, I attend to some of Said’s comments on humanism and contrapuntality to examine what IR scholars can learn from Said about *feeling and thinking globally* concretely, thoroughly and carefully. IR Professionals in an Age of Empire: From ‘International Experts’ to ‘Global Public Intellectuals’ One of the profound effects of the war on terror initiated by the Bush administration has been a significant constriction of a democratic public sphere, which has included the active and aggressive curtailment of intellectual and political dissent and a sharp delineation of national boundaries along with concentration of state power. The academy in this context has become a particularly embattled site with some highly disturbing onslaughts on academic freedom. At the most obvious level, this has involved fairly well-calibrated neoconservative attacks on US higher education that have invoked the mantra of ‘liberal bias’ and demanded legislative regulation and reform10, an onslaught supported by a well-funded network of conservative think tanks, centres, institutes and ‘concerned citizen groups’ within and outside the higher education establishment11 and with considerable reach among sitting legislators, jurists and policy-makers as well as the media. But what has in part made possible the encroachment of such nationalist and statist agendas has been a larger history of the corporatisation of the university and the accompanying ‘professionalisation’ that goes with it. Expressing concern with ‘academic acquiescence in the decline of public discourse in the United States’, Herbert Reid has examined the ways in which the university is beginning to operate as another transnational corporation12, and critiqued the consolidation of a ‘culture of professionalism’ where academic bureaucrats engage in bureaucratic role-playing, minor academic turf battles mask the larger managerial power play on campuses and the increasing influence of a relatively autonomous administrative elite and the rise of insular ‘expert cultures’ have led to academics relinquishing their claims to public space and authority.13 While it is no surprise that the US academy should find itself too at that uneasy confluence of neoliberal globalising dynamics and exclusivist nationalist agendas that is the predicament of many contemporary institutions around the world, there is much reason for concern and an urgent need to rethink the role and place of intellectual labour in the democratic process. This is especially true for scholars of the global writing in this age of globalisation and empire. Edward Said has written extensively on the place of the academy as one of the few and increasingly precarious spaces for democratic deliberation and argued the necessity for public intellectuals immured from the seductions of power.14 Defending the US academy as one of the last remaining utopian spaces, ‘the one public space available to real alternative intellectual practices: no other institution like it on such a scale exists anywhere else in the world today’15, and lauding the remarkable critical theoretical and historical work of many academic intellectuals in a lot of his work, Said also complains that ‘the American University, with its munificence, utopian sanctuary, and remarkable diversity, has defanged (intellectuals)’16. The most serious threat to the ‘intellectual vocation’, he argues, is ‘professionalism’ and mounts a pointed attack on the proliferation of ‘specializations’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ with their focus on ‘relatively narrow areas of knowledge’, ‘technical formalism’, ‘impersonal theories and methodologies’, and most worrisome of all, their ability and willingness to be **seduced by power**.17 Said mentions in this context the funding of academic programmes and research which came out of the exigencies of the Cold War18, an area in which there was considerable traffic of political scientists (largely trained as IR and comparative politics scholars) with institutions of policy-making. Looking at various influential US academics as ‘organic intellectuals’ involved in a dialectical relationship with foreign policy-makers and examining the institutional relationships at and among numerous think tanks and universities that create convergent perspectives and interests, Christopher Clement has studied US intervention in the Third World both during and after the Cold War made possible and justified through various forms of ‘intellectual articulation’.19 This is not simply a matter of scholars working for the state, but indeed a larger question of intellectual orientation. It is not uncommon for IR scholars to feel the need to formulate their scholarly conclusions in terms of its relevance for global politics, where ‘relevance’ is measured entirely in terms of policy wisdom. Edward Said’s searing indictment of US intellectuals – policy-experts and Middle East experts - in the context of the first Gulf War20 is certainly even more resonant in the contemporary context preceding and following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The space for a critical appraisal of the motivations and conduct of this war has been considerably diminished by the expertise-framed national debate wherein certain kinds **of ethical questions** irreducible **to formulaic ‘for or against’ and** ‘costs and benefits’ analysiscan simply **not be raised**. In effect, what Said argues for, and IR scholars need to pay particular heed to, is an understanding of ‘intellectual relevance’ that is larger and more worthwhile, that is about the posing of critical, historical, ethical and perhaps unanswerable questions rather than the offering of recipes and solutions, that is about politics (rather than techno-expertise) in the most fundamental and important senses of the vocation.21

#### And lit and history checks – there is a deep base on drones and kritikal theory – it’s harder to cut a policy drones aff than a kritikal one – and I read this aff at GSU as did Wayne State - there is no way they are not prepared.

#### And policy debate is built on extra-topical constructs – fiat is necessary to evaluate plan merit and advocacy skills and switch sides are in-round benefits – which means that good is good enough – we have reasons to affirm the 1AC – make them prove their limits aren’t arbitrary

### Jourde

#### Coherence – only incorporation of representations can make sense of political reality

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Relations between states are, at least in part, constructed upon representations. Representations are interpretative prisms through which decision-makers make sense of a political reality, through which they define and assign a subjective value to the other states and non-state actors of the international system, and through which they determine what are significant international political issues.2 For instance, officials of a given state will represent other states as 'allies', 'rivals', or simply 'insignificant', thus assigning a subjective value to these states. Such subjective categorizations often derive from representations of these states' domestic politics, which can for instance be perceived as 'unstable\*, 'prosperous', or 'ethnically divided'. It must be clear that representations are not objective or truthful depictions of reality; rather they are subjective and political ways of seeing the world, making certain things 'seen' by and significant for an actor while making other things 'unseen' and 'insignificant'.3 In other words, they are founded on each actor's and group of actors' cognitive, cultural-social, and emotional standpoints**.** Being fundamentally political, representations are the object of tense struggles and tensions, as some actors or groups of actors can impose on others their own representations of the world, of what they consider to be appropriate political orders, or appropriate economic relations, while others may in turn accept, subvert or contest these representations. Representations of a foreign political reality influence how decision-making actors will act upon that reality. In other words, as subjective and politically infused interpretations of reality, representations constrain and enable the policies that decision-makers will adopt vis-a-vis other states; they limit the courses of action that are politically thinkable and imaginable, making certain policies conceivable while relegating other policies to the realm of the unthinkable.4 Accordingly, identifying how a state represents another state or non-state actor helps to understand how and why certain foreign policies have been adopted while other policies have been excluded. To take a now famous example, if a transnational organization is represented as a group of 'freedom fighters', such as the multi-national mujahideen in Afghanistan in the 1980s, then military cooperation is conceivable with that organization; if on the other hand the same organization is represented as a 'terrorist network', such as Al-Qaida, then military cooperation as a policy is simply not an option. In sum. the way in which one sees, interprets and imagines the 'other\* delineates the course of action one will adopt in order to deal with this 'other'.

### 1ar - bureacratization

### 1ar – k2 policy

#### Academic investigations into framing are a precondition for policy proposals

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How are scholarly ideas utilised? IR scholars concerned with the ‘gap’ between the ‘two worlds’ complain about the allegedly limited impact their research has on the practice of foreign policy.14 They express a noteworthy dissatisfaction, on the one hand with the apparent lack of interest for ‘policy-relevant’ research in their own discipline, and on the other with a lack of concern for relevant research among practitioners of foreign policy.15 Although they are not concerned with IR, the available empirical studies of how other social sciences have been politically utilised confirm that research only very rarely leads to direct implementation of policy recommendations.16 For two reasons, however, the prevailing dissatisfaction with the lack of discernable policy effects of research is misguided. Firstly, it expresses a traditional ‘engineering’ perspective, based on unrealistic assumptions of rationality in social science and public policy.17 Secondly, as public policy theorist Tim Booth has argued, it is far too limiting to conceive of ‘policy relevance’ in terms of effects that ‘will be concrete [. . .] and open to direct and objective appraisal’.18 Expectations of a strictly ‘rational’ or ‘undiluted’ usage of scholarly ideas will only lead to disillusionment.19 In contrast, a perspective focusing on political utilisation takes into account a much wider array of possible connections between research and policy, which includes instrumental as well as conceptual and symbolic usage. Clearly, the distinction between instrumental, conceptual, and symbolic usage is analytical rather than empirical, and the three categories are not mutually exclusive. Thus, an idea may at the same time have an instrumental, conceptual, and symbolic function in politics, or be utilised in only one or two of these ways. The theory of interdemocratic peace,20 for example, can be interpreted as a ‘roadmap’21 for US foreign policy. Not only does this usage suggest concrete policy recommendations (for example, support general elections as a peace-building measure), but also imply a particular concept of the world (universal liberalism) with obvious symbolic implications (legitimating foreign policy actions with authoritative scholarship). Several observers of the research-policy interface argue that if anything, scholarly ideas are of greatest value when used conceptually.22 In supplying concepts, scholars can serve an ‘enlightenment’ function, which does not solve policy problems, but which supplies ‘the intellectual conditions for problem solving’.23 Thus, the impact of IR scholarship and indeed of social science research more generally, has had little to do with the presentation of empirical evidence and providing policy recommendations, and a lot more to do with restructuring and reorganising knowledge.24 We argue, however, that even if instrumental usage is unusual, it should not be dismissed. Symbolic usage is more specifically about reinforcing commitments, bolstering support, shifting responsibilities, legitimating decisions already made, and defending against criticism by referring to respected researchers.25 When policymakers describe how they make use of social science they use graphic words: ‘support’, ‘back up’, ‘sell’, ‘justify’, ‘document’ and ‘counter’.26 In short, legitimisation and blame avoidance27 are two symbolic ways of utilising scholarship which are particularly noteworthy. Policymakers use science in accordance with their own interests and demands, but there are also transformative effects of communication, diffusion, and interpretation. Once an idea has been incorporated in the formulation of policy individual policy makers have little or no control of how it is interpreted or used by other actors in the policy process. Thus, we also want add to this typology by arguing that even if strategically employed for the purpose of legitimisation, the inclusion of research ideas in policy formulations tend to make such ideas a part of the general vocabulary of policy makers. Thus, the symbolic use of ideas often has wider implications than those that were calculated as part of the initial strategy, highlighting the need to take seriously this particular type of research utilisation. When are scholarly ideas politically utilised? Obstacles and opportunities When – or under what conditions – is IR scholarship politically utilised? Drawing on the literature on ideas and agendas, the public policy literature on the relationship between social science and public policy, and past IR writings on this relationship, we focus on two conditions that arguably are particularly benign for political utilisation of scholarship: 1. If scholarship is framed in a way that is easily accessible for policymakers: This concerns both the ‘packaging’ and ‘marketing’ of ideas. 2. If scholarship is compatible with established policy paradigms: That is, the degree to which an idea is able to ‘install’ itself within institutionalised ways of conceptualising problems and solutions. These two conditions are sufficiently specific to be empirically studied, yet broad enough to incorporate basic building blocks of political analysis – actors and their framing strategies, underlying ideas, and institutional context.28 Framing matters It is often argued that if scholars are able to popularise their findings and arguments and tweak them for the audience they have in mind, the chances of getting audience attention increase. On the highest level of generality, this also means conforming to the characterisation of policy making as preoccupied with ‘objectives’ and ‘objectivity’.29 More specifically, this might imply excluding lengthy theoretical and methodological exercises and instead moving directly to the points that policymakers might find most useful. Much of the ‘scientific paraphernali’ gets lost, or has to get lost, in order to become politically utilised.30 In contrast to researchers, practitioners are rarely interested in what methods or theories are used to produce a particular observation or argument.31 In short, packaging matters. This point can be further developed by drawing on the framing literature.32 Depending on how a situation or idea is framed, the chances of resolving intractable policy controversies can change dramatically.33 More generally, the point could be made that both science and politics are practices of argumentation, and that ‘strategic framing’ is therefore essential for the saliency of an idea.34 The power of policy paradigms The literature on the power of ideas highlights the significance of institutionalised ideational frameworks, which correspond to policy paradigms, doctrines, policy schemes, and other descriptors of these overarching conceptual and cognitive structures in policy systems.35 Policy paradigms are maintained by networks of centrally placed actors – what Baumgartner and Jones call ‘policy monopolies.36 Put simply, if scholarly ideas are not compatible with the ruling policy paradigm, the chance of any form of research utilisation is very small.37 Ideational impact within an unchanged policy paradigm should not be dismissed, however.38 We suggest this observation is qualified by clarifying that non-compatible ideas can be used as targets of critique, and, as noted earlier, for the purpose of blame avoidance.39 If policymakers do not see any need to consider scholarly (or indeed any other type of ideas), but are in fact satisfied with the status quo, then the chances for influencing policy are meager, ceteris paribus. This is a point addressed, for instance, in epistemic community theory.40 If on the other hand there is uncertainty in the policy community on how to approach certain policy issues, there will be a political ‘demand’ for new ideas, including those produced in the academic community. However, a ‘demand’ caused by a general uncertainty has to be expressed and acted upon. Without ‘policy entrepreneurs’41 who know how and when to act to make a difference, not even the most golden opportunity will result in policy change. When policymakers do not see any need for new input of ideas, for example because their style of decision making is action-oriented and based on ‘gut feeling’ rather than on research and lengthy intellectual deliberations, this can prevent even the most fervent advocacy coalition from breaking a policy monopoly. If, however, an advocacy coalition can be formed with key actors inside the governmental apparatus itself, the possibility that ideas will be utilised is increased. Such coalitions can also have significance for the shaping of demand for new ideas.42 Institutionalised communication allows policy entrepreneurs to get involved at a fairly early stage in the policy process. Later in the process, issues tend to ‘solidify’ around more or less fixed positions, decreasing the room for conceptual discussions, and hence, for scholarly ideas to become utilised.43

### Predictions

#### Extend Ibanez and Iniguez – society is non-linear because it’s a complex/chaotic system – makes precise predictions impossible – means you default to ethical decision makings because it’s the only definite good – that’s Dillon

#### Mor ev - You cannot make linear predictions within the international system – it’s inherently volatile

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Why is surprise the permanent condition of the U.S. political and economic elite? In 2007–8, when the global ﬁnancial system imploded, the cry that no one could have seen this coming was heard everywhere, despite the existence of numerous analyses showing that a crisis was unavoidable. It is no surprise that one hears precisely the same response today regarding the current turmoil in the Middle East. The critical issue in both cases is the artiﬁcial suppres- sion of volatility—the ups and downs of life—in the name of stability. It is both mis- guided and dangerous to push unobserved risks further into the statistical tails of the probability distribution of outcomes and allow these high-impact, low-probability “tail risks” to disappear from policymakers’ ﬁelds of observation. What the world is witnessing in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya is simply what happens when highly constrained systems explode. Complex systems that have artiﬁcially suppressed volatility tend to become extremely fragile, while at the same time exhibiting no visible risks. In fact, they tend to be too calm and exhibit minimal variability as silent risks accumulate beneath the surface. Although the stated intention of political leaders and economic policymakers is to stabilize the system by inhibiting ﬂuctuations, the result tends to be the opposite. These artiﬁcially con- strained systems become prone to “Black Swans”—that is, they become extremely vulnerable to large-scale events that lie far from the statistical norm and were largely unpredictable to a given set of observers. Such environments eventually experi- ence massive blowups, catching everyone oª-guard and undoing years of stability or, in some cases, ending up far worse than they were in their initial volatile state. Indeed, the longer it takes for the blowup to occur, the worse the resulting harm in both economic and political systems. Seeking to restrict variability seems to be good policy (who does not prefer stability to chaos?), so it is with very good intentions that policymakers unwittingly increase the risk of major blowups. And it is the same misperception of the properties of natural systems that led to both the economic crisis of 2007–8 and the current turmoil in the Arab world. The policy implications are identical: to make systems robust, all risks must be visible and out in the open— ﬂuctuat nec mergitur(it ﬂuctuates but does not sink) goes the Latin saying. Just as a robust economic system is one that encourages early failures (the concepts of “fail small” and “fail fast”), the U.S. gov- ernment should stop supporting dictato- rial regimes for the sake of pseudostability and instead allow political noise to rise to the surface. Making an economy robust in the face of business swings requires allowing risk to be visible; the same is true in politics. SEDUCED BY STABILITY Both the recent ﬁnancial crisis and the current political crisis in the Middle East are grounded in the rise of complexity, interdependence, and unpredictability. Policymakers in the United Kingdom and the United States have long promoted policies aimed at eliminating ﬂuctuation— no more booms and busts in the economy, no more “Iranian surprises” in foreign policy. These policies have almost always produced undesirable outcomes. For example, the U.S. banking system became very fragile following a succession of pro- gressively larger bailouts and government interventions, particularly after the 1983 rescue of major banks (ironically, by the same Reagan administration that trum- peted free markets). In the United States, promoting these bad policies has been a bipartisan eªort throughout. Republicans have been good at fragilizing large corpora- tions through bailouts, and Democrats have been good at fragilizing the government. At the same time, the ﬁnancial system as a whole exhibited little volatility; it kept get- ting weaker while providing policymakers with the illusion of stability, illustrated most notably when Ben Bernanke, who was then a member of the Board of Gover- nors of the U.S. Federal Reserve, declared the era of “the great moderation” in 2004. Putatively independent central bankers fell into the same trap. During the 1990s, U.S. Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan wanted to iron out the economic cycle’s booms and busts, and he sought to control economic swings with interest-rate reductions at the slightest sign of a downward tick in the economic data. Furthermore, he adapted his eco- nomic policy to guarantee bank rescues, with implicit promises of a backstop—the now infamous “Greenspan put.” These policies proved to have grave delayed side effects. Washington stabilized the market with bailouts and by allowing certain com- panies to grow “too big to fail.” Because policymakers believed it was better to do something than to do nothing, they felt obligated to heal the economy rather than wait and see if it healed on its own. The foreign policy equivalent is to support the incumbent no matter what. And just as banks took wild risks thanks to Greenspan’s implicit insurance policy, client governments such as Hosni Mubarak’s in Egypt for years engaged in overt plunder thanks to similarly reliable U.S. support. Those who seek to prevent volatility on the grounds that any and all bumps in the road must be avoided paradoxically increase the probability that a tail risk will cause a major explosion. Consider as a thought experiment a man placed in an artiﬁcially sterilized environment for a decade and then invited to take a ride on a crowded subway; he would be expected to die quickly. Likewise, preventing small forest ﬁres can cause larger forest ﬁres to become devastating. This property is shared by all complex systems. In the realm of economics, price con- trols are designed to constrain volatility on the grounds that stable prices are a good thing. But although these controls might work in some rare situations, the long-term effect of any such system is an eventual and extremely costly blowup whose cleanup costs can far exceed the beneﬁts accrued. The risks of a dictatorship, no matter how seemingly stable, are no diªerent, in the long run, from those of an artiﬁcially controlled price. Such attempts to institutionally engineer the world come in two types: those that conform to the world as it is and those that attempt to reform the world. The nature of humans, quite reasonably, is to in- tervene in an eªort to alter their world and the outcomes it produces. But government interventions are laden with unintended— and unforeseen—consequences, particularly in complex systems, so humans must work with nature by tolerating systems that absorb human imperfections rather than seek to change them. Take, for example, the recent celebrated documentary on the ﬁnancial crisis, Inside Job, which blames the crisis on the malfea- sance and dishonesty of bankers and the incompetence of regulators. Although it is morally satisfying, the ﬁlm naively over- looks the fact that humans have always been dishonest and regulators have always been behind the curve. The only diªerence this time around was the unprecedented magnitude of the hidden risks and a mis- understanding of the statistical properties of the system. What is needed is a system that can prevent the harm done to citizens by the dishonesty of business elites; the limited competence of forecasters, economists, and statisticians; and the imperfections of regulation, not one that aims to eliminate these ﬂaws. Humans must try to resist the illusion of control: just as foreign policy should be intelligence-proof (it should minimize its reliance on the competence of information-gathering organizations and the predictions of “experts” in what are inherently unpredictable domains), the economy should be regulator-proof, given that some regulations simply make the system itself more fragile. Due to the complexity of markets, intricate regulations simply serve to generate fees for lawyers and proﬁts for sophisticated derivatives traders who can build complicated ﬁnancial products that skirt those regulations. DON’T BE A TURKEY The life of a turkey before Thanksgiving is illustrative: the turkey is fed for 1,000 days and every day seems to conﬁrm that the farmer cares for it—until the last day, when conﬁdence is maximal. The “turkey problem” occurs when a naive analysis of stability is derived from the absence of past variations. Likewise, conﬁdence in stability was maximal at the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis in 2007. The turkey problem for humans is the result of mistaking one environment for another. Humans simultaneously inhabit two systems: the linear and the complex. The linear domain is characterized by its predictability and the low degree of interaction among its components, which allows the use of mathematical methods that make forecasts reliable. In complex systems, there is an absence of visible causal links between the elements, masking a high degree of interdependence and extremely low predictability. Nonlinear elements are also present, such as those commonly known, and generally misun- derstood, as “tipping points.” Imagine someone who keeps adding sand to a sand pile without any visible consequence, until suddenly the entire pile crumbles. It would be foolish to blame the collapse on the last grain of sand rather than the structure of the pile, but that is what people do consistently, and that is the policy error. U.S. President Barack Obama may blame an intelligence failure for the gov- ernment’s not foreseeing the revolution in Egypt (just as former U.S. President Jimmy Carter blamed an intelligence failure for his administration’s not fore- seeing the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran), but it is the suppressed risk in the statis- tical tails that matters—not the failure to see the last grain of sand. As a result of complicated interdependence and conta- gion eªects, in all man-made complex systems, a small number of possible events dominate, namely, Black Swans. Engineering, architecture, astronomy, most of physics, and much of common science are linear domains. The complex domain is the realm of the social world, epidemics, and economics. Crucially, the linear domain delivers mild variations without large shocks, whereas the complex domain delivers massive jumps and gaps. Complex systems are misunderstood, mostly because humans’ sophistication, obtained over the history of human knowl- edge in the linear domain, does not transfer properly to the complex domain. Humans can predict a solar eclipse and the trajectory of a space vessel, but not the stock market or Egyptian political events. All man-made complex systems have commonalities and even universalities. Sadly, deceptive calm (followed by Black Swan surprises) seems to be one of those properties. THE ERROR OF PREDICTION As with a crumbling sand pile, it would be foolish to attribute the collapse of a fragile bridge to the last truck that crossed it, and even more foolish to try to predict in advance which truck might bring it down. The system is responsible, not the compo- nents. But after the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–8, many people thought that predict- ing the subprime meltdown would have helped. It would not have, since it was a symptom of the crisis, not its underlying cause. Likewise, Obama’s blaming “bad in- telligence” for his administration’s failure to predict the crisis in Egypt is symptomatic of both the misunderstanding of complex systems and the bad policies involved. Obama’s mistake illustrates the illusion of local causal chains—that is, confusing catalysts for causes and assuming that one can know which catalyst will produce which eªect. The ﬁnal episode of the upheaval in Egypt was unpredictable for all observers, especially those involved. As such, blam- ing the ciais as foolish as funding it to forecast such events. Governments are wasting billions of dollars on attempting to predict events that are produced by interdependent systems and are therefore not statistically understandable at the individual level. As Mark Abdollahian of Sentia Group, one of the contractors who sell predictive analytics to the U.S. government, noted regarding Egypt, policymakers should “think of this like Las Vegas. In blackjack, if you can do four percent better than the average, you’re making real money.” But the analogy is spurious. There is no “four percent better” on Egypt. This is not just money wasted but the construction of a false conﬁdence based on an erroneous focus. It is telling that the intelligence analysts made the same mistake as the risk-management systems that failed to predict the economic crisis—and oªered the exact same excuses when they failed. Political and economic “tail events” are unpredictable, and their probabilities are not scientiﬁcally measurable. No matter how many dollars are spent on research, predicting revolutions is not the same as counting cards; humans will never be able to turn politics into the tractable random- ness of blackjack. Most explanations being oªered for the current turmoil in the Middle East follow the “catalysts as causes” confusion. The riots in Tunisia and Egypt were initially attributed to rising commodity prices, not to stiﬂing and unpopular dictatorships. But Bahrain and Libya are countries with high gdps that can aªord to import grain and other commodities. Again, the focus is wrong even if the logic is comforting. It is the system and its fragility, not events, that must be studied—what physicists call “percolation theory,” in which the proper- ties of the terrain are studied rather than those of a single element of the terrain. When dealing with a system that is inherently unpredictable, what should be done? Diªerentiating between two types of countries is useful. In the ﬁrst, changes in government do not lead to meaningful diªerences in political outcomes (since political tensions are out in the open). In the second type, changes in govern- ment lead to both drastic and deeply unpredictable changes. Consider that Italy, with its much- maligned “cabinet instability,” is economi- cally and politically stable despite having had more than 60 governments since World War II (indeed, one may say Italy’s stability is because of these switches of government). Similarly, in spite of consis- tently bad press, Lebanon is a relatively safe bet in terms of how far governments can jump from equilibrium; in spite of all the noise, shifting alliances, and street protests, changes in government there tend to be comparatively mild. For exam- ple, a shift in the ruling coalition from Christian parties to Hezbollah is not such a consequential jump in terms of the country’s economic and political stability. Switching equilibrium, with control of the government changing from one party to another, in such systems acts as a shock absorber. Since a single party cannot have total and more than temporary control, the possibility of a large jump in the regime type is constrained. In contrast, consider Iran and Iraq. Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi and Sad- dam Hussein both constrained volatility by any means necessary. In Iran, when the shah was toppled, the shift of power to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was a huge, unforeseeable jump. After the fact, analysts could construct convincing accounts about how killing Iranian Communists, driving the left into exile, demobilizing the demo- cratic opposition, and driving all dissent into the mosque had made Khomeini’s rise inevitable. In Iraq, the United States removed the lid and was actually surprised to ﬁnd that the regime did not jump from hyperconstraint to something like France. But this was impossible to predict ahead of time due to the nature of the system itself. What can be said, however, is that the more constrained the volatility, the bigger the regime jump is likely to be. From the French Revolution to the triumph of the Bolsheviks, history is replete with such examples, and yet somehow humans remain unable to process what they mean. THE FEAR OF RANDOMNESS Humans fear randomness—a healthy ancestral trait inherited from a diªerent environment. Whereas in the past, which was a more linear world, this trait enhanced ﬁtness and increased chances of survival, it can have the reverse eªect in today’s complex world, making volatility take the shape of nasty Black Swans hiding behind deceptive periods of “great moderation.” This is not to say that any and all volatility should be embraced. Insurance should not be banned, for example. But alongside the “catalysts as causes” confusion sit two mental biases: the illusion of control and the action bias (the illusion that doing something is always better than doing nothing). This leads to the desire to impose man-made solutions. Greenspan’s actions were harmful, but it would have been hard to justify inaction in a democracy where the incentive is to always promise a better outcome than the other guy, regard- less of the actual, delayed cost. Variation is information. When there is no variation, there is no information. This explains the cia’s failure to predict the Egyptian revolution and, a generation before, the Iranian Revolution—in both cases, the revolutionaries themselves did not have a clear idea of their relative strength with respect to the regime they were hoping to topple. So rather than sub- sidize and praise as a “force for stability” every tin-pot potentate on the planet, the U.S. government should encourage countries to let information ﬂow upward through the transparency that comes with political agitation. It should not fear ﬂuc- tuations per se, since allowing them to be in the open, as Italy and Lebanon both show in diªerent ways, creates the stability of small jumps. As Seneca wrote in De clementia, “Repeated punishment, while it crushes the hatred of a few, stirs the hatred of all . . . just as trees that have been trimmed throw out again countless branches.” The imposition of peace through repeated punishment lies at the heart of many seemingly intractable conﬂicts, including the Israeli-Palestinian stalemate. Further- more, dealing with seemingly reliable high-level officials rather than the people themselves prevents any peace treaty signed from being robust. The Romans were wise enough to know that only a free man under Roman law could be trusted to engage in a contract; by extension, only a free people can be trusted to abide by a treaty. Treaties that are negotiated with the consent of a broad swath of the populations on both sides of a conﬂict tend to survive. Just as no central bank is powerful enough to dictate stability, no superpower can be powerful enough to guarantee solid peace alone. U.S. policy toward the Middle East has historically, and especially since 9/11, been unduly focused on the repression of any and all political ﬂuctuations in the name of preventing “Islamic fundamentalism”— a trope that Mubarak repeated until his last moments in power and that Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddaﬁ continues to emphasize today, blaming Osama bin Laden for what has befallen him. This is wrong. The West and its autocratic Arab allies have strengthened Islamic funda- mentalists by forcing them underground, and even more so by killing them. As Jean-Jacques Rousseau put it, “A little bit of agitation gives motivation to the soul, and what really makes the species prosper is not peace so much as freedom.” With freedom comes some unpredictable ﬂuctuation. This is one of life’s packages: there is no freedom without noise—and no stability without volatility.∂

#### Neg scenarios are epistemologically flawed – trapped at the level preemptable actualizable fears – makes their scenarios non-falsifiable and non-empirical - locks in the current psychle of preemptive warfare as self-fulfilling prophecy

**Massumi 07** (Brian, professor of Philosophy at European Graduate School, “Potential Politics and the Primacy of Pre-Emption” Retrieved 10/15/13 R.C.)

17.This co-productive logic is well illustrated in the policies and statements of the Bush administration, and explains why Bush has never admitted that the War in Iraq has been a failure even as he is coming to accept that it isn't exactly avictory yet and that "tactical changes" are now necessary. Consider this statement from June 19, 2005: "Some may agreewith my decision to remove Saddam Hussein from power, but allof us can agree that the world's terrorists have now made Iraq a central front in the war on terror." This was Bush's way of admitting that there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Objectively, his reasons for invading were false. But threat in today's world is not objective. It is potential. Potential threat calls for a potential politics. As Bush and many members of his administration have repeatedy argued, Saddam Hussein could have had weapons of mass destruction and that if he had had them, he would have used them. Could have, would have, if: the potential nature of the threat requires a conditional logic. A conditional statement cannot be wrong. First because it only asserts a potential, and second because, especially in the case of something so slippery as a potential, you can't prove the negative. Even if it wasn't actually there, it will always still have been there potentially: Saddam could have restarted his weapons projects at any moment. When you act on "could haves" and"would haves" you are right by definition as long as your reasons for acting are not objective. It is simply a category error to give empirical reasons for your actions with respect to potential politics. This is what the Bush administration insiders meant when they ridiculed "the reality-based community" as being hopelessly behind the times. Nowadays, your action is right by definition as long as you go politically conditional, and have a good reason for doing so.18.Fear is always a good reason to go politically conditional. Fear is the palpable action in the present of a threatening future cause. It acts just as palpably whether the threat is determinate or not. It weakens your resolve, createsstress, lowers consumer confidence, and may ultimately lead to individual and/or economic paralysis. To avoid the paralysis, which would make yourself even more of a target and carry the fear to even higher level, you must simply act. In Bush administration parlance, you "go kinetic."6 You leap into action on a level with the potential that frightens you. You do that, once again, by inciting the potential to take an actual shape you can respond to. You trigger a production of what you fear. You turn the objectively indeterminate cause into an actual effect so you can actually deal with it in some way. Any time you feel the need to act, then all you have to do is actuate a fear. The production of the effect follows as smoothly as a reflex. This affective dynamicis still very much in place, independent of Rumsfeld's individual fate. It will remain in place as long as fear and remains politicallyactuatable.

#### And the negative’s use of linear causality, cherry picked evidence and hyperbolic impacts forecloses good predictions.

**Gardner and Tetlock 2011** [Dan, columnist and senior writer with the Ottawa Citizen, and Philip, Leonore Annenberg University Professor @ UPenn “Overcoming Our Aversion to Acknowledging Our Ignorance” Cato Unbound 7-11 http://www.cato-unbound.org/2011/07/11/dan-gardner-and-philip-tetlock/overcoming-our-aversion-to-acknowledging-our-ignorance]\

Cynics resonate to these results and sometimes cite them to justify a stance of populist know-nothingism. But we would be wrong to stop there, because Tetlock also discovered that the experts could be divided roughly into two overlapping yet statistically distinguishable groups. One group would actually have been beaten rather soundly even by the chimp, not to mention the more formidable extrapolation algorithm. The other would have beaten the chimp and sometimes even the extrapolation algorithm, although not by a wide margin.

One could say that this latter cluster of experts had real predictive insight, however modest. What distinguished the two groups was not political ideology, qualifications, access to classified information, or any of the other factors one might think would make a difference. What mattered was the style of thinking.

One group of experts tended to use one analytical tool in many different domains; they preferred keeping their analysis simple and elegant by minimizing “distractions.” These experts zeroed in on only essential information, and they were unusually confident—they were far more likely to say something is “certain” or “impossible.” In explaining their forecasts, they often built up a lot of intellectual momentum in favor of their preferred conclusions. For instance, they were more likely to say “moreover” than “however.”

The other lot used a wide assortment of analytical tools, sought out information from diverse sources, were comfortable with complexity and uncertainty, and were much less sure of themselves—they tended to talk in terms of possibilities and probabilities and were often happy to say “maybe.” In explaining their forecasts, they frequently shifted intellectual gears, sprinkling their speech with transition markers such as “although,” “but,” and “however.”

Using terms drawn from a scrap of ancient Greek poetry, the philosopher Isaiah Berlin once noted how, in the world of knowledge, “the fox knows many things but the hedgehog knows one big thing.” Drawing on this ancient insight, Tetlock dubbed the two camps hedgehogs and foxes.

The experts with modest but real predictive insight were the foxes. The experts whose self-concepts of what they could deliver were out of alignment with reality were the hedgehogs.

#### Environmental apocalypticism causes eco-authoritarianism and mass violence against those deemed environmental threats – also causes political apathy which turns case

Buell 3Frederick—cultural critic on the environmental crisis and a Professor of English at Queens College and the author of five books, *From Apocalypse To Way of Life,* pages 185-186

Looked at critically, then, crisis discourse thus suffers from a number of liabilities. First, it seems to have become a political liability almost as much as an asset. It calls up a fierce and effective opposition with its predictions; worse, its more specific predictions are all too vulnerable to refutation by events. It also exposes environmentalists to being called grim doomsters and antilife Puritan extremists. Further, concern with crisis has all too often tempted people to try to find a “total solution” to the problems involved— a phrase that, as an astute analyst of the limitations of crisis discourse, John Barry, puts it, is all too reminiscent of the Third Reich’s infamous “final solution.”55 A total crisis of society—environmental crisis at its gravest—threatens to translate despair into inhumanist authoritarianism; more often, however, it helps keep merely dysfunctional authority in place. It thus leads, Barry suggests, to the belief that only elite- and expert-led solutions are possible.56 At the same timeit depoliticizes people, inducing them to accept their impotence as individuals; this is something that has made many people today feel, ironically and/or passively, that since it makes no difference at all what any individual does on his or her own, one might as well go along with it. Yet another pitfall for the full and sustained elaboration of environmental crisis is, though least discussed, perhaps the most deeply ironic. A problem with deep cultural and psychological as well as social effects, it is embodied in a startlingly simple proposition: the worse one feels environmental crisis is, the more one is tempted to turn one’s back on the environment. This means, preeminently, turning one’s back on “nature”—on traditions of nature feeling, traditions of knowledge about nature (ones that range from organic farming techniques to the different departments of ecological science), and traditions of nature-based activism. If nature is thoroughly wrecked these days, people need to delink from nature and live in postnature—a conclusion that, as the next chapter shows, many in U.S. society drew at the end of the millenium. Explorations of how deeply “nature” has been wounded and how intensely vulnerable to and dependent on human actions it is can thus lead, ironically, to further indifference to nature-based environmental issues, not greater concern with them. But what quickly becomes evident to any reflective consideration of the difficulties of crisis discourse is that all of these liabilities are in fact bound tightly up with one specific notion of environmental crisis—with 1960s- and 1970s-style environmental apocalypticism. Excessive concern about them does not recognize that crisis discourse as a whole has significantly changed since the 1970s. They remain inducements to look away from serious reflection on environmental crisis only if one does not explore how environmental crisis has turned of late from apocalypse to dwelling place. The apocalyptic mode had a number of prominent features: it was preoccupied with running out and running into walls; with scarcity and with the imminent rupture of limits; with actions that promised and temporally predicted imminent total meltdown; and with (often, though not always) the need for immediate “total solution.” **Thus doomsterism was its reigning mode;** eco-authoritarianism was a grave temptation; and as crisis was elaborated to show more and more severe deformations of nature, temptation increased to refute it, or give up, or even cut off ties to clearly terminal “nature.”

## CIR

#### No immigration reform – House-Senate compromise unlikely, path to citizenship prevents agreement

Rojas 13 (Leslie Berestein Rojas, Immigration and Emerging Communities Reporter, “Immigration issues to watch in 2014,” 12-30-13,

<http://www.scpr.org/blogs/multiamerican/2013/12/30/15492/immigration-top-stories-to-watch-in-2014/>)

A year ago, advocates, politicos and pundits were speculating as to whether 2013 would be the year that the political winds finally favored a major immigration overhaul, the first since 1986. Republicans were smarting from the losses they took in the November 2012 election, with Latino and Asian voters stepping up in record numbers to hand a re-election victory to President Obama. But some veteran immigration watchers who had been down this path in 2006 and 2007 weren't so sure - and they were right. While the Senate passed a sweeping bill in June, which included a path to U.S. citizenship for unauthorized immigrants, House Republicans simply couldn't get behind it. Plans for a bipartisan House bill crumbled. The Senate plan stalled in the House and the rest is, well, recent political history. Fast-forward to the end of the year: Republican House Speaker John Boehner has dropped hints that he'll push the House on immigration reform in 2014. But what the House votes on might look quite different from what Senate supporters of a comprehensive reform plan envisioned. "We're likely to see bills that deal with specific components, like the Dream Act, high-skilled visas, and probably a bill that passes the House, or is at least proposed in the House, that would propose legalization for undocumented immigrants without a pathway to citizenship," said Karthick Ramakrishnan, a UC Riverside political scientist who studies immigration. This could even make for strange bedfellows, political observers say, as advocates push for a halt to deportations and Republicans float legal status without a path to citizenship. But compromises will most likely only go so far. President Obama and other immigration reform supporters have said they're willing to consider the piecemeal approach that House Republicans favor. But only if these piecemeal bills address key provisions of the Senate bill - and a path to U.S. citizenship is the key provision of the Senate bill. Without it, it's hard to count on much Senate support. As for the political winds, if the timing wasn't right for a broader proposal to succeed in 2013, when might it be? The short answer: 2014. But it's an election year, so don't hold your breath. There will also be other high-priority distractions in the coming year, like a debt ceiling redux. Where does this leave any kind of significant immigration legislation? "There's a small possibility after the election, in the lame duck session," said Louis DeSipio, a political scientist and immigration expert at UC Irvine. "But I would only expect action if Republicans lose more than they did in 2012, and that does not seem to be a likely outcome." On that note, the Republican Party has been making a concerted effort to reach to Latino voters in the wake of 2012. But the truth is that many House GOP members are secure in their districts without these voters, at least so far. Which means that it may take a little longer for a major immigration overhaul to go the distance.

#### Obama not spending capital on piecemeal reform – Ball is in the House’s court

Boyer 13 (Dave Boyer, The Washington Times, “Obama’s liberal wish list for Congress likely to stall in election year,” 12-31-13,

<http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/dec/31/obamas-wish-list-likely-to-stall-in-election-year/?page=all>)

The legislative battles in which Mr. Obama chooses to engage will be fought in the Senate, where majority Democrats have eliminated the filibuster for executive branch and judicial nominees. If Republicans win back control of the Senate in November, the president is unlikely to find them in an accommodating mood. Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, Kentucky Republican, said Democrats are trying to ram through proposals without regard to the minority party. “The Senate rules are now just as optional to Washington Democrats as the Obamacare mandates they decide they don’t like,” Mr. McConnell said shortly before Congress adjourned for the year. “All of which obviously makes a mockery of our institutions and our laws, and all of which suggests that this is a majority that has zero confidence in its own ideas. This is a majority that can’t allow the minority to have a meaningful say when it comes to nominees. This is a majority that won’t allow members to offer amendments when it counts.” Meeting of the minds? One of the few prospects for bipartisan achievement in 2014 could be immigration reform. Although Speaker John A. Boehner, Ohio Republican, has said the House won’t pass the Senate’s comprehensive plan, some Republicans believe the House will approve at least some portions of the Senate bill. “Anything that gets done on the legislative front will get done because Republicans want it, and I would put immigration in that category,” Mr. Feehery said.

#### Not intrinsic – the government can pass immig reform and plan - key to effective decisionmaking

#### **Economic security becomes the basis of liberal intervention – manifests in violence**

Neocleous 8 – Mark Neocleous, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, 2008 [Critique of Security, p.101-105]

In other words, the new international order moved very quickly to reassert the connection between economic and national security: the commitment to the former was simultaneously a commitment to the latter, and vice versa. As the doctrine of national security was being born, the major player on the international stage would aim to use perhaps its most important power of all – its economic strength – in order to re-order the world. And this re-ordering was conducted through the idea of ‘economic security’.99 Despite the fact that ‘economic security’ would never be formally deﬁned beyond ‘economic order’ or ‘economic well-being’,100 the signiﬁcant conceptual consistency between economic security and liberal order-building also had a strategic ideological role. By playing on notions of ‘economic well-being’, economic security seemed to emphasise economic and thus ‘human’ needs over military ones. The reshaping of global capital, international order and the exercise of state power could thus look decidedly liberal and ‘humanitarian’. This appearance helped co-opt the liberal Left into the process and, of course, played on individual desire for personal security by using notions such as ‘personal freedom’ and ‘social equality’.101 Marx and Engels once highlighted the historical role of the bour geoisie in shaping the world according to its own interests. The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere . . . It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them . . . to become bourgeois in themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image.102 In the second half of the twentieth century this ability to ‘batter down all Chinese walls’ would still rest heavily on the logic of capital, but would also come about in part under the guise of security. The whole world became a garden to be cultivated – to be recast according to the logic of security. In the space of ﬁfteen years the concept ‘economic security’ had moved from connoting insurance policies for working people to the desire to shape the world in a capitalist fashion – and back again. In fact, it has constantly shifted between these registers ever since, being used for the constant reshaping of world order and resulting in a comprehensive level of intervention and policing all over the globe. Global order has come to be fabricated and administered according to a security doctrine underpinned by the logic of capital accumulation and a bourgeois conception of order. By incorporating within it a particular vision of economic order, the concept of national security implies the interrelatedness of so many different social, econ omic, political and military factors that more or less any development anywhere can be said to impact on liberal order in general and America’s core interests in particular. Not only could bourgeois Europe be recast around the regime of capital, but so too could the whole international order as capital not only nestled, settled and established connections, but also ‘secured’ everywhere. Security politics thereby became the basis of a distinctly liberal philosophy of global ‘intervention’, fusing global issues of economic management with domestic policy formations in an ambitious and frequently violent strategy. Here lies the Janus-faced character of American foreign policy.103 One face is the ‘good liberal cop’: friendly, prosperous and democratic, sending money and help around the globe when problems emerge, so that the world’s nations are shown how they can alleviate their misery and perhaps even enjoy some prosperity. The other face is the ‘bad liberal cop’: should one of these nations decide, either through parliamentary procedure, demands for self-determination or violent revolution to address its own social problems in ways that conﬂict with the interests of capital and the bourgeois concept of liberty, then the authoritarian dimension of liberalism shows its face; the ‘liberal moment’ becomes the moment of violence. This Janus-faced character has meant that through the mandate of security the US, as the national security state par excellence, has seen ﬁt to either overtly or covertly re-order the affairs of myriads of nations – those ‘rogue’ or ‘outlaw’ states on the ‘wrong side of history’.104 ‘Extrapolating the ﬁgures as best we can’, one CIA agent commented in 1991,‘there have been about 3,000 major covert operations and over 10,000 minor operations – all illegal, and all designed to disrupt, destabilize, or modify the activities of other countries’, adding that ‘every covert operation has been rationalized in terms of U.S. national security’.105 These would include ‘interventions’ in Greece, Italy, France, Turkey, Macedonia, the Ukraine, Cambodia, Indonesia, China, Korea, Burma, Vietnam, Thailand, Ecuador, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Bolivia, Grenada, Paraguay, Nicaragua, El Salvador, the Philippines, Honduras, Haiti, Venezuela, Panama, Angola, Ghana, Congo, South Africa, Albania, Lebanon, Grenada, Libya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and many more, and many of these more than once. Next up are the ‘60 or more’ countries identiﬁed as the bases of ‘terror cells’ by Bush in a speech on 1 June 2002.106 The methods used have varied: most popular has been the favoured technique of liberal security – ‘making the economy scream’ via controls, interventions and the imposition of neo-liberal regulations. But a wide range of other techniques have been used: terror bombing; subversion; rigging elections; the use of the CIA’s ‘Health Alteration Committee’ whose mandate was to ‘incapacitate’ foreign ofﬁcials; drug-trafﬁcking;107 and the sponsorship of terror groups, counterinsurgency agencies, death squads. Unsurprisingly, some plain old fascist groups and parties have been co-opted into the project, from the attempt at reviving the remnants of the Nazi collaborationist Vlasov Army for use against the USSR to the use of fascist forces to undermine democratically elected governments, such as in Chile; indeed, one of the reasons fascism ﬂowed into Latin America was because of the ideology of national security.108 Concomitantly, ‘national security’ has meant a policy of non-intervention where satisfactory ‘security partnerships’ could be established with certain authoritarian and military regimes: Spain under Franco, the Greek junta, Chile, Iraq, Iran, Korea, Indonesia, Cambodia, Taiwan, South Vietnam, the Philippines, Turkey, the ﬁve Central Asian republics that emerged with the break-up of the USSR, and China. Either way, the whole world was to be included in the new‘secure’ global liberal order. The result has been the slaughter of untold numbers. John Stock well, who was part of a CIA project in Angola which led to the deaths of over 20,000 people, puts it like this: Coming to grips with these U.S./CIA activities in broad numbers and ﬁguring out how many people have been killed in the jungles of Laos or the hills of Nicaragua is very difﬁcult. But, adding them up as best we can, we come up with a ﬁgure of six million people killed – and this is a minimum ﬁgure. Included are: one million killed in the Korean War, two million killed in the Vietnam War, 800,000 killed in Indonesia, one million in Cambodia, 20,000 killed in Angola – the operation I was part of – and 22,000 killed in Nicaragua.109 Note that the six million is a minimum ﬁgure, that he omits to mention rather a lot of other interventions, and that he was writing in 1991. This is security as the slaughter bench of history. All of this has been more than conﬁrmed by events in the twenty ﬁrst century: in a speech on 1 June 2002, which became the basis of the ofﬁcial National Security Strategy of the United States in September of that year, President Bush reiterated that the US has a unilateral right to overthrow any government in the world, and launched a new round of slaughtering to prove it. While much has been made about the supposedly ‘new’ doctrine of preemption in the early twenty-ﬁrst century, the policy of preemption has a long history as part of national security doctrine. The United States has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to counter a sufﬁcient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves . . . To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre emptively.110 In other words, the security policy of the world’s only superpower in its current ‘war on terror’ is still underpinned by a notion of liberal order-building based on a certain vision of ‘economic order’. The National Security Strategy concerns itself with a ‘single sustainable model for national success’ based on ‘political and economic liberty’, with whole sections devoted to the security beneﬁts of ‘economic liberty’, and the beneﬁts to liberty of the security strategy proposed.111 Economic security (that is, ‘capitalist accumulation’) in the guise of ‘national security’ is now used as the justiﬁcation for all kinds of ‘intervention’, still conducted where necessary in alliance with fascists, gangsters and drug cartels, and the proliferation of ‘national security’ type regimes has been the result. So while the national security state was in one sense a structural bi-product of the US’s place in global capitalism, it was also vital to the fabrication of an international order founded on the power of capital. National security, in effect, became the perfect strategic tool for landscaping the human garden.112 This was to also have huge domestic consequences, as the idea of containment would also come to reshape the American social order, helping fabricate a security apparatus intimately bound up with national identity and thus the politics of loyalty.

#### negative focuses too much on macro-political drama – trades off with substantive strategization

**Kappeler 95** Associate Professor at Al-Akhawayn University (Susanne, The Will to Violence, p. 10-11)

We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of `collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equival­ent of a universal acquittal.' On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective `assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility leading to the well-known illusion of our apparent `powerlessness’ and its accompanying phe­nomenon, our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens even more so those of other nations have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina or Somalia since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgement, and thus into underrating the respons­ibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls `organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually or­ganized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major powermongers: For we tend to think that we cannot `do' anything, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of `What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as `virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like `I want to stop this war', `I want military intervention', `I want to stop this backlash', or `I want a moral revolution." 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our `non-comprehension’: our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we `are' the war in our `unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the `fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don't' our readiness, in other words, to build ident­ities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the `others'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape `our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence.

### 2NC Environment / Resources – Ahmed

#### Global environmental crises and instability are inevitable – only a rejection of security enables a holistic systems approach that can ameliorate global crises

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The twenty-first century heralds the unprecedented acceleration and convergence of multiple, interconnected global crises – climate change, energy depletion, food scarcity, and economic instability. While the structure of global economic activity is driving the unsustainable depletion of hydrocarbon and other natural resources, this is simultaneously escalating greenhouse gas emissions resulting in global warming. Both global warming and energy shocks are impacting detrimentally on global industrial food production, as well as on global financial and economic instability. Conventional policy responses toward the intensification of these crises have been decidedly inadequate because scholars and practitioners largely view them as separate processes. Yet increasing evidence shows they are deeply interwoven manifestations of a global political economy that has breached the limits of the wider environmental and natural resource systems in which it is embedded. In this context, orthodox IR's flawed diagnoses of global crises lead inexorably to their ‘securitisation’, reifying the militarisation of policy responses, and naturalising the proliferation of violent conflicts. Global ecological, energy and economic crises are thus directly linked to the ‘Otherisation’ of social groups and problematisation of strategic regions considered pivotal for the global political economy. Yet this relationship between global crises and conflict is not necessary or essential, but a function of a wider epistemological failure to holistically interrogate their structural and systemic causes. In 2009, the UK government's chief scientific adviser Sir John Beddington warned that without mitigating and preventive action 'drivers' of global crisis like demographic expansion, environmental degradation and energy depletion could lead to a 'perfect storm' of simultaneous food, water and energy crises by around 2030.1 Yet, for the most part, conventional policy responses from national governments and international institutions have been decidedly inadequate. Part of the problem is the way in which these crises are conceptualised in relation to security. Traditional disciplinary divisions in the social and natural sciences, compounded by bureaucratic compartmentalisation in policy-planning and decision-making, has meant these crises are frequently approached as largely separate processes with their own internal dynamics. While it is increasingly acknowledged that cross-disciplinary approaches are necessary, these have largely failed to recognise just how inherently interconnected these crises are. As Brauch points out, 'most studies in the environmental security debate since 1990 have ignored or failed to integrate the contributions of the global environmental change community in the natural sciences. To a large extent the latter has also failed to integrate the results of this debate.\*" Underlying this problem is the lack of a holistic systems approach to thinking about not only global crises, but § Marked 17:43 § their causal origins in the social, political, economic, ideological and value structures of the contemporary international system. Indeed, it is often assumed that these contemporary structures are largely what need to be 'secured\* and protected from the dangerous impacts of global crises, rather than transformed precisely to ameliorate these crises in the first place. Consequently, policy-makers frequently overlook existing systemic and structural obstacles to the implementation of desired reforms. In a modest effort to contribute to the lacuna identified by Brauch, this paper begins with an empiric ally-oriented, interdisciplinary exploration of the best available data on four major global crises — climate change, energy depletion, food scarcity and global financial instability — illustrating the systemic interconnections between different crises, and revealing that their causal origins are not accidental but inherent to the structural failings and vulnerabilities of existing global political, economic and cultural institutions. This empirical evaluation leads to a critical appraisal of orthodox realist and liberal approaches to global crises in international theory and policy. This critique argues principally that orthodox IR reifies a highly fragmented, de-historicised ontology of the international system which underlies a reductionist, technocratic and compartmentalised conceptual and methodological approach to global crises. Consequently, rather than global crises being understood causally and holistically in the systemic context of the structure of the international system, they are 'securitised\* as amplifiers of traditional security threats, requiring counter-productive militarised responses and/or futile inter-state negotiations. While the systemic causal context of global crisis convergence and acceleration is thus elided, this simultaneously exacerbates the danger of reactionary violence, the problematisation of populations in regions impacted by these crises and the naturalisation of the consequent proliferation of wars and humanitarian disasters. This moves us away from the debate over whether resource 'shortages\* or 'abundance\* causes conflicts, to the question of how either can generate crises which undermine conventional socio-political orders and confound conventional IR discourses, in turn radicalising the processes of social polarisation that can culminate in violent conflict.

**U.S can’t solve warming**

**Grose ‘3-15**

(Thomas K., National Geographic News Writer, “As U.S. Cleans Its Energy Mix, It Ships Coal Problems Abroad”

Ready for some good news about the environment? Emissions of carbon dioxide in the United States are declining. But don't celebrate just yet. A major side effect of that cleaner air in the U.S. has been the further darkening of skies over Europe and Asia. The United States essentially is exporting a share of its greenhouse gas emissions in the form of coal, data show. If the trend continues, the dramatic changes in energy use in the United States—in particular, the switch from coal to newly abundant natural gas for generating electricity—will have only a modest impact on global warming, observers warn. The Earth's atmosphere will continue to absorb heat-trapping CO2, with a similar contribution from U.S. coal. It will simply be burned overseas instead of at home. "Switching from coal to gas only saves carbon if the coal stays in the ground," said John Broderick, lead author of a study on the issue by the Tyndall Center for Climate Change Research at England's Manchester University. The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) released data this week showing that United States coal exports hit a record 126 million short tons in 2012, a 17 percent increase over the previous year. Overseas shipments surpassed the previous high mark set in 1981 by 12 percent. The United States clearly is using less coal: Domestic consumption fell by about 114 million tons, or 11 percent, largely due to a decline in the use of coal for electricity. But U.S. coal production fell just 7 percent. The United States, with the world's largest coal reserves, continued to churn out the most carbon-intensive fuel, producing 1 billion tons of coal from its mines in 2012. Emissions Sink The EIA estimates that due largely to the drop in coal-fired electricity, U.S. carbon emissions from burning fossil fuel declined 3.4 percent in 2012. If the numbers hold up, it will extend the downward trend that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) outlined last month in its annual greenhouse gas inventory, which found greenhouse gas emissions in 2011 had fallen 8 percent from their 2007 peak to 6,703 million metric tons of CO2 equivalent (a number that includes sources other than energy, like methane emissions from agriculture). In fact, if you don't count the recession year of 2009, U.S. emissions in 2011 dropped to their lowest level since 1995. President Barack Obama counted the trend among his environmental accomplishments in his State of the Union address last month: "Over the last four years, our emissions of the dangerous carbon pollution that threatens our planet have actually fallen." The reason is clear: Coal, which in 2005 generated 50 percent of U.S. electricity, saw its share erode to 37.4 percent in 2012, according to EIA's new short-term energy outlook. An increase in U.S. renewable energy certainly played a role; renewables climbed in those seven years from 8.7 percent to 13 percent of the energy mix, about half of it hydropower. But the big gain came from natural gas, which climbed from 19 percent to 30.4 percent of U.S. electricity during that time frame, primarily because of abundant supply and low prices made possible by hydraulic fracturing, or fracking. The trend appears on track to continue, with U.S. coal-fired plants being retired at a record pace. But U.S. coal producers haven't been standing still as their domestic market has evaporated. They've been shipping their fuel to energy-hungry markets overseas, from the ports of Norfolk, Baltimore, and New Orleans. Although demand is growing rapidly in Asia—U.S. coal exports to China were on track to double last year—Europe was the biggest customer, importing more U.S. coal last year than all other countries combined. The Netherlands, with Europe's largest port, Rotterdam, accepted the most shipments, on pace for a 24 jump in U.S. coal imports in 2012. The United Kingdom, the second largest customer, saw its U.S. coal imports jump more than 70 percent. The hike in European coal consumption would appear to run counter to big government initiatives across the Continent to cut CO2 emissions. But in the European Union, where fracking has made only its initial forays and natural gas is still expensive, American coal is, well, dirt cheap. European utilities are now finding that generating power from coal is a profitable gambit. In the power industry, the profit margin for generating electricity from coal is called the "clean dark spread"; at the end of December in Great Britain, it was going for about $39 per megawatt-hour, according to Argus. By contrast, the profit margin for gas-fired plants—the "clean spark spread"—was about $3. Tomas Wyns, director of the Center for Clean Air Policy-Europe, a nonprofit organization in Brussels, Belgium, said those kinds of spreads are typical across Europe right now. The EU has a cap-and-trade carbon market, the $148 billion, eight-year-old Emissions Trading System (ETS). But it's in the doldrums because of a huge oversupply of permits. That's caused the price of carbon to fall to about 4 euros ($5.23). A plan called "backloading" that would temporarily extract allowances from the market to shore up the price has faltered so far in the European Parliament. "A better carbon price could make a difference" and even out the coal and gas spreads, Wyns said. He estimates a price of between 20 and 40 euros would do the trick. "But a structural change to the Emissions Trading System is not something that will happen very quickly. A solution is years off." The Tyndall Center study estimates that the burning of all that exported coal could erase fully half the gains the United States has made in reducing carbon emissions. For huge reserves of shale gas to help cut CO2 emissions, "displaced fuels must be reduced globally and remain suppressed indefinitely," the report said. Future Emissions It is not clear that the surge in U.S. coal exports will continue. One reason for the uptick in coal-fired generation in Europe has been the looming deadline for the EU's Large Combustion Plant Directive, which will require older coal plants to meet lower emission levels by the end of 2015 or be mothballed. Before that phaseout begins, Wyns says, "there is a bit of a binge going on." Also, economic factors are at work. Tyndall's Broderick said American coal companies have been essentially selling surplus fuel overseas at low profit margins, so there is a likelihood that U.S. coal production will decrease further. The U.S. government forecasters at EIA expect that U.S. coal exports will fall back to about 110 million tons per year over the next two years, due to economic weakness in Europe, falling international prices, and competition from other coal-exporting countries. The Paris-based International Energy Agency (IEA) calls Europe's "coal renaissance" a temporary phenomenon; it forecasts an increasing use of renewables, shuttering of coal plants, and a better balance between gas and coal prices in the coming years. But IEA does not expect that the global appetite for coal will slacken appreciably. The agency projects that, by 2017, coal will rival oil as the world's primary energy source, mainly because of skyrocketing demand in Asia. U.S. coal producers have made clear that they aim to tap into that growing market.

#### Framing climate change in terms of security legitimizes preemptive military doctrines to ‘contain’ anticipated threats while foreclosing attention to the institutional drivers of environmental degradation – rejecting the militarization of warming is a prerequisite to forging effective political responses to ecological destruction.

Gilbert 12 [Emily, Director of the Canadian Studies Program in the Graduate Program in Geography at the University of Toronto, ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies, 11(1), “The Militarization of Climate Change,” p. 1-10]

Climate change has been identified as a top military concern. We should be worried. In his acceptance speech for the Nobel Peace Prize in December 2009, US President Barack Obama stressed the importance of climate change to national security, and the military’s growing interest in the issue.2 Then, on February 1, 2010 the US Pentagon released its Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) that includes, for the first time ever, climate change as a military concern.3. The QDR is a powerful document that shapes the military’s operating principles and budgets for the next four years. The 2010 QDR argues that military roles and missions on the battlefield will need to be reformulated to address changing environmental conditions. Climate change is presented as a ‘threat multiplier’ that will propel food and water scarcity, environmental degradation, poverty, the spread of disease, and mass migration. Each of these could contribute to ‘failed state’ scenarios which will demand military intervention. In an earlier report of high-ranking admirals and generals at the Center for Naval Analyses, upon which the QDR builds, this ‘threat multiplier’ effect and ‘failed state’ scenario is also directly linked to future acts of extremism and terrorism (CNA, 2007; see also CNA, 2009; Korb et al, 2009; Warner and Singer, 2009; Parthemore and Rogers, 2010).¶ While the US military’s interest in climate change has escalated, it is not alone. In 2007, the Australian Defence Force produced a 12 page study, Climate Change, the Environment, Resources and Conflict that proposed a new role for the military in resource protection, eg tackling illegal fishing as fish stocks relocate due to the changing climate. Two years later, a Department of Defence white paper identified climate change as a ‘threat multiplier,’ especially in the ‘fragile states’ of its neighbouring South Pacific islands (Australian Government, 2009). In the UK, the DCDC Global Strategic Trends Programme 2007-2036 report—issued from within the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and considered to be a source document for national defence policy—has asserted a future role for military engagement in climate change-related scenarios around humanitarian and disaster relief, and for protecting oil and gas resources in insecure areas (see also MoD, 2010). The DCDC report even indicated that intervention in outer space might be required so as ‘to mitigate the effects of climate change, or to harness climatological features in the support of military or strategic advantage’ (MoD 2006: 65). Other governments discussing militarization include Germany, France, and perhaps also, secretly, India and China (Mabey 2007: 9). Military experts from across Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the US have issued a joint statement warning of the impending security impact of climate change.4 There was even a special session on “Climate change and the military” organized by the Brookings Institution, Chatham House, and the Institute for Environmental Security at the COP15 meetings in Copenhagen in December 2009.5¶ What to make of this growing military interest in climate change? There is a longstanding literature that addresses the linking of environment and security discourses (eg Käkönen, 1994; Deudney, 1999; Homer-Dixon, 1999; Barnett, 2001, 2006; Dalby, 2002, 2009; Davis, 2007). Although cautionary in their approach, many of these authors suggest that linking the two concepts makes it possible to open up questions around both security and the environment. Ragnhild Nordås and Nils Petter Gleditsch, for example, broaden the security debate to address human security, which takes account of matters relating to issues such as migration, disease, food security (Nordås and Gleditsch, 2007). Others argue that hiving climate change to national security discourses may galvanize more public interest (Dalby, 2009)—something that has been attempted with the Kerry-Graham-Lieberman climate bill in the US. But while the literature on security and environment raises some important questions, I want to problematize both the way that security is being constituted through the military, and the concept of the environment that is being mobilized, by paying particular attention to how militarization is unfolding in the US.¶ First, the military’s interest in climate change resurrects a narrow concept of security. Although the 2010 QDR recognizes impending concerns associated with human security (eg migration, disease and food security), it models the anticipated conflict through a traditional state-to-state war scenario, refracted through a neo-Malthusian conflict over resources (Dalby, 2009; Homer-Dixon, 1999). Resource conflict and other climate change impacts are mapped onto already vulnerable places in Sub Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia (Broder, 2009; CNA, 2007; Podesta and Ogden, 2007-08; Werz and Manlove, 2009), where, it is argued, they will act as ‘threat multipliers’ that will escalate into ‘failed state’ scenarios. This perpetuates a model whereby the enemy to the nation is elsewhere, and that ‘environmental threats are something that foreigners do to Americans or to American territory,’ not as a result of domestic policies (Eckersley 2009: 87). In this vein, the CIA has established a Center on Climate Change and National Security to collect foreign ‘intelligence’ on the national security impact of environmental change in other parts of the world.6¶ The bifurcation of domestic security and external threat reinforces a fiction of territorial and nationalist integrity, and works against thinking about climate change as a global problem with a need for global responsibility and global solutions (Dalby 2009: 50; Deudney 1999: 189).7 Moreover, the model of external threats coheres easily with the competitive frame that has been established between China and the US, as they vie not only for economic ascendency and resource-acquisition, but also for energy security and environmental policies and initiatives.8 In this vein, Thomas Freidman has proposed a militant green nationalism, something along the lines of a triumphalist Green New Deal that will recapture US global hegemony (Friedman, 2009).9 Achieving this result requires, however, more political agreement across US Democrats and Republicans, and it is precisely here that reframing climate change as a military issue seems to be an effective strategy for cross-partisan agreement.10 But what are the costs when militarization becomes necessary to legitimize climate change action?¶ The upshot is that the military is also legitimized, to the detriment of formal and informal politics. In a secretive and hierarchical military framework there is limited scope for public participation or legislative debate (UNEP 2007: 403). Militaries are about the ‘maintenance of elite power’ (Barnett 2001: 25). Issues regarding social justice are disregarded in favour of national objectives, while the vulnerabilities institutionalized through climate change are perpetuated (Barnett, 2006). This is particularly apparent vis-à-vis environmental refugees, which the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change estimates will swell to 150 million by 2050 (Reuveny, 2007). Militarism encourages the use of force against foreigners, with barriers erected to exclude those who bear the immediate impact of climate change, even though they are usually the least responsible for climate change. As Paul Smith notes, Operation Seal Signal, which the US deployed in 1994 to deal with 50,000 refugees from Haiti and Cuba, offers an instructive example of how the military addresses refugees, most of whom were held at Guantanamo Bay while their cases were processed (Smith, 2007). The responses to human tragedy in Haiti and Hurricane Katrina, when military priorities took hold over the immediate needs of the racialized, impoverished victims, speaks to the dangers of concocting security threats so that abandonment is prioritized over assistance (Giroux, 2006; Hallward, 2010). This is part of a worrisome trend of the rise of an ‘aid-military complex’ and military ‘encroachment’ on civilian-sponsored development (Hartmann 2010: 240).¶ Finally, the military’s approach to climate change does not lend itself to addressing fundamental social structures that perpetuate environmental degradation: oil dependency, oil colonialism, and the deepening international fragmentation of rich and poor. The conditions that entrench insecurity are thus left unchallenged. Rather, attention is directed to long term defensive planning and risk scenarios around potential disaster outcomes with the military presented as the only, or simply the best and most capable, institution for dealing with the scope of the adversity (QDR 2010: 86). Since Robert Kaplan’s polemic ‘The Coming Anarchy,’ much of the literature invokes similar disaster scenarios (Kaplan, 1994, see also 2008; Schwartz and Randall, 2003; Campbell et al, 2007; Dwyer, 2008). Security exercises are used to model these disasters; eg a 2008 exercise at the National Defense University in Washington that anticipated that refugees escaping flooding in Bangladesh would lead to religious and political conflict at the Indian border (Werz and Manlove, 2009). Worst possible outcomes are thus anticipated, and they these become the basis for actions in the present (de Goede 2008: 159). As Melinda Cooper writes vis-à-vis the worst-case security scenarios of the Schwartz and Randall report, ‘It recommends that we intervene in the conditions of emergence of the future before it gets a chance to befall us; that we make an attempt to unleash transformative events on a biospheric scale before we get dragged away by nature’s own acts of emergence’ (Cooper 2006: 126).¶ Cooper’s argument introduces my second concern regarding the militarization of climate change: the ways that the environment is being mobilized. As noted above, the focus on resource wars casts the environment as a ‘hostile power’ (Eckersley 2009: 87). Or, scarcity and degradation are ‘naturalised,’ while institutional causes are obscured (Hartmann 2010: 235). Either way, nature is an externality to be managed as the resurrection of the concept of ‘the commons’ in these debates affirms (see Posen, 2003). Advocacy groups and government representatives alike are using the ‘commons’ to inform their perspectives on climate change security. Abraham Denmark and James Mulvenon explicitly delineate the concept’s legacy to Garrett Hardin’s controversial piece, ‘The tragedy of the commons,’ and his argument that ‘Freedom in a commons brings ruins to all’ (Denmark and Mulvenon 2010: 7-8). Rather than privatization, the contemporary version of the polemic posits that military force is necessary to prevent the misuse and abuse of navigable passageways. In a web article entitled ‘The Contested Commons’ that is linked to the QDR2010, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy of the United States Michèle Flournoy and Shawn Brimley suggest that since WWII, US grand strategy has ‘centered on creating and sustaining an international system that facilitates commerce, travel, and thus the spread of Western values including individual freedom, democracy, and liberty.’11 This ‘uncontested access to and stability within the global commons’ of air, sea, space and cyberspace has only been possible because of US military power. As the emergent multipolar world challenges its hegemony, they argue, it is in the US’s interest to shore up its military and defend the ‘global commons,’ in partnership with its allies (see also Denmark and Mulvenon, 2010).12 The military build-up in the Arctic, where states are jockeying over access to previously unnavigable passageways and resources, is held out as an example of how emergent resource conflicts are taking shape, but also the need for a coordinated US approach to protect its interests (Carmen et al, 2010; Paskal, 2007).¶ The discourse around the ‘commons’ reinforces the idea that the environment is to be controlled and managed. This is equally the case with respect to how the militarization of climate change is also reshaping domestic politics and society. Catherine Lutz reflects that ‘As or more important than the efficacy of a mode of warfare... has been the form of life it has encouraged inside the nation waging it’ (Lutz 2002: 727). Her own critical work on militarism examines the social formations that are organized around the military, eg the racialized and gender labour economies of suburban US formed around the production of nuclear weapons. Environmental relations need also be taken into consideration: they are constituted through the military which is charged with bringing nature under control: to model it, to manage it and to make it predictable in the name of security, albeit an anthropocentric security that is only ‘understood in human terms’ (Barnett 2001: 65; emphasis in the original). That the US military is increasingly becoming a site and source for new ‘green’ technologies is just one such manifestation of the orchestration of life for military purposes, and is suggestive of the problematic deepening and extension of the military-industrial-academic-scientific complex.¶ The QDR sets out the complex web of collaborations that will tackle climate change: the ‘DoD will partner with academia, other U.S. agencies, and international partners to research, develop, test, and evaluate new sustainable energy technologies’ (QDR 2010: 87). Military innovations such as GPS, radar and the Internet are offered as comparable examples of transformative technological innovation that have had immense social benefit (Warner and Singer 2009: 6). This provides a rationalization for the millions of dollars that are being siphoned into the military so that it can be at the frontlines of developing alternative energy projects. For example, the largest existing solar panel project in the US is at the Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, where 70,000 solar panels are spread out across 140 acres to generate 14 megawatts (about 45 million KWh) a year.13 A $2 billion agreement signed in 2009 between DoD and Irwin Energy Security Partners will make Fort Irwin—the army’s largest training camp located in California’s Mojave Desert— energy independent by 2022, with a 500MW solar project on 21 square miles.14 Zero-energy homes are being built on US military bases.15 A project is underway to introduce 4,000 electric cars into the armed forces to create one of the largest such fleets in the world (Pew 2010: 13). The first hybrid Navy vessel, a Wasp class amphibious assault ship, is already on the water (Rosenthal, 2010). In Iraq, the Tactical Garbage to Energy Refinery (or ‘tiger’) is converting garbage to biofuel to power generators.16 In Helmand Province, Afghanistan, solar panels are being used on tents, for recharging computers and other equipment (Rosenthal, 2010). The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)—the research and development office of the military in change of technological advancement—is developing alternative fuel sources, from products such as algae and rapeseed that are less carbon-intensive.17 The objective of biofuels development is to make military transport more sustainable, like the ‘Great Green Fleet’ of aircraft carriers and support ships that is in development for 2016 (Shachtman, 2010).¶ It is not that this ‘greening’ of the military is unwarranted, or that these technological developments are not desirable. If there is to be a military at all, it might as well be more sustainable. As it is, the US military is the world’s single largest energy consumer—it consumes more than any other private or public institution, and more than 100 nations (Warner and Singer 2009: 1; see also Deloitte, 2009; Sanders, 2009). This comprises 0.8% of total US energy, and about 78% of government energy use—roughly 395,000 barrels of oil a day, equivalent to all of Greece (Warner and Singer 2009: 2). Its operations abroad are equally rapacious. In the first-ever energy audit in a war zone it was revealed that US marines in Afghanistan used 800,000 gallons of fuel each day.18 Figures from Iraq show that between 2003 and 2007 the war generated 141 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent—more than 139 countries (Reisch and Kretzmann 2008: 4). There is thus a clear case for reducing the military’s damaging impact on the landscape.¶ The question that the ‘greening’ of the military sidesteps, however, is whether there should indeed be a military at all. Moreover, even if the military persists, should it be where climate change innovations are located? Should public funds be directed into the military to fight climate change? In a speech on energy security in March, 2010, President Obama lauded the $2.7 billion already spent that year by the DoD on energy efficiency measures.19 This investment is being used to support select military partnerships, with a strong emphasis on privatization. The solar panel project at Nellis Air Force Base Nevada, mentioned above, is a privately financed and owned initiative by MMA Renewables, with equity investments from Citi and Allstate.20 The panels will be owned by the financiers; Nellis will lease the land, and purchase the power. The Fort Irwin project agreed to in October 2009 operates along similar lines, and is a partnership with the Clark Energy Group and Acciona Solar Power.21 The zero-energy homes being installed in Kentucky are a public-private partnership between the US Army and Actus Lend Lease.22 Universities are also complicit: the Tactical Garbage to Energy Refinery at¶ the Victory Base Camp in Baghdad, for example, has been developed in conjunction with Purdue University.23¶ When environmental issues are filtered through the military, however, less money is available for innovation in other sectors, unless they are working in partnership with the military. Military investment in green initiatives, for example, is not likely to develop innovations around public transport, but rather focus on the kind of transportation required for military needs, which will then become available to consumers—much as Sports Utility Vehicles (SUVs) are an offshoot of four-wheel drive military vehicles. Moreover, a military-driven agenda contributes to a more protectionist approach around technological innovation that is exacerbated alongside an uneven landscape of investment (UNEP 2007: 404).24¶ The priorities around climate change are thus skewed by the military. As President Obama affirmed in his March 2010 speech, the primary national interest is really with energy independence, not energy reduction.25 At the same time that he was applauding the greening of the military, the President announced the expansion of offshore oil and gas exploration, including in the Bay of Mexico. (This expansion was later suspended in wake of the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster, before being resumed.) The military has also presented a case for mitigating the reliance on (foreign) oil and developing renewable energy, which has more to do with the impact on military personnel in the field than with ecological principles. In the last five years, fuel consumption at US forward operating bases in conflict zones has increased from 50 million gallons to 500 million gallons a year (Deloitte 2009: 15). This creates a dangerous situation for the ‘long tail’ of convoys that are needed to supply these bases (Pew 2010: 7). Some reports indicate that more than three quarters of US casualties in war zones are the result of supply vehicles that have been targeted by improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and convoys have been identified by Commandant General James Conway as ‘one of his most pressing problems related to risk of casualties’ (Deloitte 2009: 15; see also CNA, 2009). Shachtman (2010) reports that in Iraq, ‘In one month, 44 trucks and 220,000 gallons of fuel were lost.’ This is a problem that the QDR takes explicitly on board. Whereas climate change is presented as a ‘threat multiplier,’ energy efficiency is described as a ‘force multiplier, because it increases the range and endurance of forces in the field and can reduce the number of combat forces diverted to protect energy supply lines, which are vulnerable to both asymmetric and conventional attacks and disruptions’ (QDR 2010: 87). The reduction of casualties is thus propelling much of the impetus for renewable energy, even though it is couched in climate change rhetoric (see also Warner and Singer 2009: 2; Deloitte 2009: 27). Notably, there is no mention, across any of the policy documents that have appeared, about the devastating environmental impact of war upon the landscapes where it takes place, and the need to prevent or even mitigate this destruction.¶ Back at home, military personnel returning from war are being enrolled as climate ‘warriors.’ During the 2009 election campaign Obama announced a ‘Green Vets Initiative’ that would provide ‘green’ training and jobs in the private sector for the 837,000 vets of Iraq and Afghanistan. While this exact initiative has not been introduced, the government has promoted ‘Green Energy Jobs’ through its Veterans Workforce Investment Program and through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.26 This is a reconfiguration, and privatization, of the civilian-military pact of cradle-to-grave provision of social welfare (see Lutz 2002: 730). To this end, programs have begun popping up across the US. The ‘Green Collar Vets’ is a non-profit organization in Texas that helps retrain and reskill vets for the green economy.27 The organization ‘Veterans Green Jobs,’ in partnership with several educational institutions and organizations such as Walmart, Whole Foods, and the Sierra Club, provides vets of four states with training opportunities for the ‘green’ economy. What differentiates their program, they argue, is that their keystone course ‘Green 101,’ makes explicit the links between green programs and national security. 28 Veterans are also taking on a more activist role to promote the shift to renewable energy. A group of US Vets, sponsored by Operation Free (whose mission is ‘to secure America with clean energy’), travelled to Copenhagen to discuss the national security dimensions of climate change (and groups have also travelled across the US to visit Senate Offices, and to the White House).29¶ Domestic programs for vets, and resource and research investments for ‘greening’ the military point to some fundamental ways that domestic social formations are being reorganized in support of the militarization of climate change. This is part of militarism’s typical ‘double move’: on the one hand, war is projected as being ‘over there’ while the ‘second move saturates our daily lives with war-ness’ (Ferguson 2009: 478). Domestic measures to address energy security are put forward as calculable, rational and even compassionate measures, while the ‘foreign’ threat is presented as non-state, elusive, and undetermined—and hence coherent with much of the discourse around diffuse ‘new wars’ and terrorist threats (Kaldor, 2006). At the same time, there is also greater convergence between the inside and the outside, and between the environment and the military in the ways that the discourses are mobilized and mapped out (Cooper, 2006). Indeed, as Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen notes, there is a coherence between pre-emptive military doctrines and precautionary environmental strategies: both are based upon a rationale for urgent action based on anticipated future disaster scenarios (Rasmussen 2006: 124). Notably, however, it is only when environmental issues are harnessed to security claims that the precautionary approach gains traction.¶ Hiving climate change to national security ensures that environmental issues will garner more attention, as is argued by many of the experts on the environment and security noted above. But as I have sought to illustrate in this paper, instead of opening up questions regarding security or the environment, these are foreclosed by a military approach. It reduces the concept of security to a nationalist, defensive strategy modelled on future disaster scenarios of resource conflict. Moreover, it perpetuates an externalized concept of nature that is to be commanded and controlled, with no real sense of ecological prioritization. Rather, energy security emerges as the primary focus for innovation and investment to combat geopolitical concerns around the reliance on foreign oil and the threat to military personnel in the field. At the same time, increased spending on the military is legitimized as it becomes a source of ‘green’ initiatives. Where does this leave politics, and more precisely, as Melinda Cooper asks, ‘What becomes of an anti-war politics when the sphere of military action infiltrates the ‘grey areas’ of everyday life, contaminating our ‘quality of life’ at the most elemental level?’ (Cooper 2006: 129). If we support climate change initiatives, are we then pro-military? If we are anti-military, do we jeopardize climate change action? As the militarization of climate change unfolds, it is this interpenetration that needs to be disrupted, both with respect to martial approaches to the environment, and with respect to the troubling attempts to use the mobilization of climate change to re-moralize war and the military.

### 2NC Warming – UQ

#### Warming denial high now because rhetoric

Stafford 3/11 -- interviewing Anthony Watts, 25-year broadcast meteorology veteran (James, 2013, "Climate Change without Catastrophe: Interview with Anthony Watts," http://oilprice.com/Interviews/Climate-Change-without-Catastrophe-Interview-with-Anthony-Watts.html)

Oilprice.com: An article that recently appeared in The Independent said that public concern over climate change has slumped to a 20 year low. In fact, only 49% of people now consider climate change a very serious issue--far fewer than at the beginning of the worldwide financial crisis in 2009. Why do you believe this is and how do you see public perception changing in the future? Anthony Watts: Most people aren’t stupid. When they can observe for themselves that the claims of the past 30 years aren’t adding up, and that the only ones left sounding the alarm are the activists, it tends to color one’s viewpoint. Mother Nature will be the final arbiter of truth on this matter, and so far she simply refuses to cooperate with the claims that have been made about “catastrophic warming”. In addition, most people see climate change as something intangible--they can’t sense it, so they tend not to worry about something they can’t perceive.